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CHAPTER I 
ntTRoDUCTION 
The year 1951 has bee'n called the yeer of' conf"_lsion. 
Many people attacking both the entire recent foreign policy of 
the United States and the United Nations t methods 1n Korea. hs.ve 
branded each with the stigma of CONFUSION. The Truman-MacArthur 
controversy has only perplexed neople more. The Kefauver inves-
tigation ot ol'ga..'11zed ism1)ling '1J1 thin the borders of Jmerica has 
so ar(Jused ,ubl1c opinion that the whole nation is wondering wha1 
the cO!.ll'plete story 1s. More recently crime investigations o.f 
large-scale dope pedcUing, million-dollar narcotic rings, and 
soandals among pu.blic officers hav€" left the man on th~ street 
beT(ildered.. Even as this chapter is bein.g wr1 tten, tru.ce talks 
are bfQinl inaug'l.1rs.ted in. Korea. The av~rage cl tizen 1.9 still 
confused about the issues at It~ke, wondering ..,yhat thE? common 
ground nsight be for !l lasting negot.iated pee.ce in Kores. t'etiNeen 
the Commllni~ts ~d oU.rselves. There are so many opinions, so 
many reports, .50 much. conject.ure- 8.nd uncertainty, is it e.ny won ... 
der that we are confused? We seem to have lost sight of snythinl 
absolute or ul time.te on wh1ch to base our judgements. 
If 'Je look 8.t seme of the modern vie¥.'s of God, V'ie CM-
1 
2 
• not help getting the impression of confusion here too. God is 
everything from a universal world spirit to a poor suffering be-
ing who needs our help as 'Jell as our pity. Atheism, pantheism, 
deIsm, personalism, f1nItism, and a host of other "isms"--all 
with dirferent viewpoints of God, all with their staunch defen-
ders! As we consider these two types of confusion, about God an 
about pres~t-day world situations, the thought strikes us that 
they seem like two manifestations of the sInne root, two effects 
of the same causes. This is not surprising. Our confusion aboll 
what man 1s and what our relation to our fellow man is, reflects 
our confusion about what God is and what our relation to Him 1s. 
One of the more popular beliefs in modern times, the 
one to which our present study is devoted, is theistic finitism. 
This is Simply the belief that God is finite, 8. S. Laurie in 
his two volume work, §xnth§tic8, has lett us a modern uhilosophe 
faced "lith an ancient problem. La.urie enccunters the nroblem or 
the meaning 0t evil, and he asks an old question. "How is Evil 
possible if' God be One, All .... powerful, and 0004,"1 Laurie defines 
evil as "the tailure of God-creative to realize the ideal of the 
individual and of the whole ~ !h! ulaQ! £t B~1n, which m!n 00-
cu~ies,ft2 Because there is evil in the world, beoause there are 
. { 1 S. S. Laurie,· Imthetlc!, II, New York, 1906, 28,. 
2 l..12JJ1., 286. 
• flaws in the universe, Laurie concludes that Ood cannot be 811-
powerf.ul; He must be finite. God has a lot of good will, tries 
hard, but often fails. 
Does God truly fail? Our answer must be, Assuredly: and 
the failure is more consoicuous, the higher the grade of 
finite being. I think it 1s Epietetul who says that God 
doe. not "take aim tor the RUlRose of miSSing the mark", 
but without doubt, here and now, the m.ark is constantly 
missed.' 
John McT. Ellis McTaggart is another Twentieth Century 
representative of the theory of a limited God. With him the 
theory grows out of the problem of time. He claims there can be 
no causal relation betw4en two substances, one or both of which 
is out ot time. He illustrates the point by imagining there ex. 
ists a timeless God. Such a God, however, cannot be the cause of 
the world. In fact, between such a God and the world there can 
be no causal rela.tion at a11.4 McTaggart treats of the problem 
of at Tinite God is some detail in his book The Nature gJ: Existenci t 
especially 10 a chapter of the second volume entitled MGod and 
Immortality." There McTaggart gives us his definition of God: 
. ! 
I take the word God to mean a b~lng who is nerson!.l" 
supreme,and good. Personality is the quality €If being 
a selt •••• In including supremacy in the definition of the 
quality of deity, I do not mean that&. being should not 
he called a God, unless he is omnipotent, but that he must 
3 lli1l., 287 • 
4. John KeT. Ellis McTaggart I Phi1osophj.Cll S,tug1es 
London, 1934, 170. 
4 
• 
be, at the least, much more powerful than any other self, 
and 80 powerful ~hat his volition can affect profoundly all 
else that exists. In including goodness, I do not mean 
that a being should not be called a God unless he is morall 
perfeg~t) but t~t he must be, at the least, more good than 
evil. 
McTaggart is not unaware that most of the theists believe that 
God is omnipotent, the creator ot all else that exists" end ab-
solutely pe~fect.6 Even so, McTaggart sticks to his position 
and does not hedge even when he says that he is doubtful that 
his God is of much religious value.? This is what McTaggart un. 
derstands by God, but does he actually hold that such a God ex-
ists? He claims there seems no reason why there should not be 
such a person as _his God. On the other hand, there seems no rea-
son why there should be such a person. So McTaggart ooncludes. 
"Our conolusions invalidate the usual, and the- strongest argu ... 
8 
menta tor the existence of such a beine." There oannot be much 
doubt, then, as to MeTaggart'. real position. God -for him means 
a finite God) but when it comes to the-aotual existence of this 
finite God, McTaggart is really-an atheist, or at least an agnos-
tic. 9 
II" 
'. 5 John MeT. Ellis McTaggart, l:.tl! NAture 9.t. ~~sttng" 
qambr1dge, 1927, 176. 
6 Ibid., 177., 
7 
. j: ~.,'- 1S,. 
g l.1UJ1., 134. 
9 ~. 
5 
Hast~ngs Rashdall in his book The Th,gry 2! ~ ~ 
Evil also donsiders tbe finiteness of God. He meets the same 
diffioulty occasioned by the existence of evil. It is h~s be-
lief that evil must be supposed. to exist a,s the necessary means 
to good!OThls fact, Rashdall is foroed to admit, implies a limi. 
tation to d1vine Qmn1potenee.11 He thus explains that evil is 
due to a limitation of God's power rather than to a limitation 
of His geodneS!1. 'gain we see, and we shall see 1 t .in even gl"eat 
er detail later in this thes!s, that the whole question of good 
and evil 1s intimately bound up with the theory of God.s finite-
I 
ness. Le1lis R. Farnell in the following passage has su:mm.arized 
well the position of Rashdal~. 
God created souls, eveJl, the bad soul, and the best ,;orld 
he could, beeaus.e he is finite and could create only what 
was ;1n his nature to create, and he has often to do evil 
as a means to good: there 1s in the ultimate natu,re of' 
things, that is to say, the ultimate nature of 004--. an 
inherent reason why greater good should not bEt obt~inabl •• 12 
The idea that God is both one and finite appears rather 
la~e in history as a popular belief'. It is true that the ancient 
Greeks and Romans as well as all the gentiles had a sort of' hier-
10 Hastings R./Bhdall, The Theoa 9l. ~ .InS. 1!1l .. 
Oxfotd, 1907, 235. 
11 ,rug,., 237 • 
. !: 12 Lewis Richard Fa.rnell, :the Attr!but!§ !2t. Gog, 
Oxford, 1925, 27Q. 
6 
• 
archy of.&2S!.1. .All these .&2!l!, indeed, w()uld have to be consid-
ered finite. Some commentators would hold that Plato believed 
in 8 finite God. 13 The notion of God, however, which 'was in-
herited from the Jewish race and preserved and expounded through~ 
out the Chrlstia.n centuries had always been the one,14 simple,1S 
eternal,16 infinite,17 perfeet,18 good19 God of St. Thomas and , 
the other scholastics. To make God finite or anything less tha,n 
omnipotent '''8S to destroy the whole notion of God. POI' longcen-
turies Christian Western civ1lization adored a God both infinite 
in power and infinite in goodness. In recent centuries, however, 
there has arisen this belief in a finite God. In vlevring briefl, 
this change from the notion of an infinite God to that of a fi. 
nite God, it will be well to consider tr~$e influences, David 
Hume_ John Stuart Mill, and William James. 
In his "tfork, Dialogy.es Q}mcern1ns NaturAl R'11g~9n, 
published a.fter his death, DaVid Hume makes mention 1n passing 
13 Edgar Sheffield Brightman, A PhilosonhY Q! Religion, 
New York, 1945, 289 • 
1.4 .Q. Q.. I I I 42 • 
1; 1· 1-, I, 3, 7. 
16 St.. !i." I, 15. 
. {-; 17 ~., 43 • 
18 1- 1-, I, 4, 1. 
19 c. a., I, 38. 
-
--
7 
• 
of the theory that God is finite. The Dialogues is one of the 
first treatises to ap~ear in English where this theory 1s even 
mentioned. The D1ilggues take place between PhIlo, Cleanthes, 
8.nd Demea; however, it is never entirely clear which of these is 
speaking Hume's true mind. Norman Kemp Smith in his edition of 
the J21.aJ,ogue,20 identIfies Hume with Philo. Most of the previ-
ous commentators had taken Cleantha. for the real Hume.21 Be 
this as it may .. both seem to subscribe at times to the idea of 
God's finiteness. It is Cleanthas in Part XI of the PlI1ggU~' 
who makes the suggestion. 
But supposing the Author of nature to be finitely perfact 
though far exceeding mankind; a satisfactory aCcollOt may 
then be given of natural and moral eVils, and every untowar~ 
phenomenon be explained and adjusted. A less evil may then 
be ehosen. in order to reach & desirable end: And in a 
word, benevolence, regulated by wisdom .. and limited by 22 
necessity, may produce just such a, world as the present. 
Hume's characters themselves make it sufficiently clear that 
their author realized the novelty of this idea of a finite God. 
SpeaJting to Philo, Cleanthes says that "he '''ould gladly hear, at 
length, v,ithout interruption, your opinion of this new theorJ. n2' 
20 Norman Kemp Smith, H~efS D~a.J,ogyel Concerning 
NaturAl Rt11giQn, Oxford, 1947, 2 • 
21 Brightman, A fll!loso;')hy: 2! Rillgion, 29.3. 
22 Smith, Rgme's plalogu§s Concerning Nitural Religion 
20~h 
2.3 Ibig_ Emphasis is mine. 
Philo a.nswers that there are fOlIr circumstances on 
which the greater part of the ills that beset sensible creatures 
dsnend. Because of these assorted evils tr~t are present in the 
universe, Philo cannot see a ground for inrerrl~1g there exists Ii 
divine goodness. )( He claims that i,r infinity is e"cluded from the 
divine attributes" we may be able to Sh011f a consistence ":lointing 
to the goodness of God. However, these conjectures ab(:ut God's 
good'ness can never be foundations for any inference that God 
24 a.ctuB,lly is good. Although Philo's real posl tlon seems to be 
that of a skeptic,25 he tries at times to champion the cause of 
God's finiteness. Thus in Chapter V he argues against Cleanthes 
with somewhat cuestionab1e logic. The cause, he says, ought to 
be ?roporti,~tned to the effect. The effect, however, as far as 
we know it, is not infinite. How, then, ca,n we ascribe infinity 
to the. Divine Being whioh is the oause?26 Yet in almost the next 
line Philo is favoring the cause of an infinite God. Proof for 
such a God must be A nrtart' 
There are many inexplioable difficulties in the works of 
nature, 'Which, if we allow a perfect Author to be')roved 
A priori, are easily solved, and become only seemingly 
difficulties, from the narrow capaCity of man, who cannot 
24 1.:tWl., 205. 
25 l.b!s1., 213. 
·1 26 !W., 166. 
9 
trace infinite relations. 27 
Hums's position, then, vlith regard to the theory of a 
finite God, was that of the first English draftsman. Certainly 
he was one oltha .first men to sketch in the English language th 
outlines of this dootrine. As 'we have already mentioned, Hume's 
D1:alogyel was a posthumous work nublished in 1779. Much of 
Humets thought was already suspect among the English readers of 
his' day, and it may be that he thought mentioning this new theor 
o.r a finite God during his lifetime would only antagonize them. 
We can agree essentia.lly with Julius 8. Bixler's c01mllent on 
Rums's contribution to the finite God theory. 
Hume in his essay on lla IfJj;ut&l Hi§t2tX $.?I. Re1t,1on ob-
serves ths.t theism develo'ped out of polytheiSm. ~y increasin 
"adulation". That is to say, men vied with each other in 
ascribing greatness to the Deity until he finally became a. 
great as their words could make him. And in the D:1.alogue, 
C9ncernlng Iffl.tllral Elliston, he hints that absolutism may 
have come about in much the same way, and tha.t both philo-
sophy and religion would be better off if the conception 
of an infinite God were superseded by tlta more accurate and 
moderate. idea. 25 
The first man of really great significance to develop 
tha.::.t rough, sketchy outline of Hume's was John Stuart M:ill. It 
was nearly one hundred years a.fter the appearance of the Dil-
27 ~., 166 • 
. !; 28 Julius Seelye Bixler, ReJ.!gion 1!! thE! Ph11gsoPllv 
gt W1l1!tm Jiltl. Boston, 1926, 140. 
10 
logue~ of flume (1779) that Mill's three EstiY! 2n Ballgion (1874) 
-
w~~s published. We m1ght remark in passing that this, too, was 
8- -postlnlmOU8 vrork. Mill rejects the argument for the existence 
of God trom the necessity ot a first cause,29 also the one from 
)0 the general consent ot mankind, as well as all.!. prior2, ;:Iroofs, 
v:hatever particular form they ta.ke.,l About the proa;t" for God ts 
existence from the marks of design in the universe, Mill caution 
11 admits: 
It must be allowed that in the present state of our know-
ledge, the ada?tations in Nature afford a large balance 
of )robability in favor of creation by intelligence. It 
is equally oertain that this is no more than probabl1ity.,2 
Talking about this same proof from deSign, Mill states in !lnothe 
plaoe that a very little consideration is enough to show that3) 
"though it nBS some force, its force is very generally overrated • 
It 1s necessary, first of Bll, to understand what Mill 
says about nature if lIe are to try to understand his thinking on 
the problem of God. In the first ot his Three Esspys .2lllllll-
~ Mill takes for his subject "Nature." He concludes that the 
29 John Stuart Mill, Three Es§al~ gn Bft1tgton, New 
York., 187,4, 153. 
)0 Ib14., 160. 
31 . Ibid .. , 16,3. 
. f·; 32 ~., 174. 
3) X:t!J.d., 16S. 
11 
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'Word nature denotes two things, either "the entire system of 
things" or "things as they v;ould be, apart from human 1:nterven-
tion."34 In the first sense, the doctrine that man ought to fol-
low nature is unmea.ning, since man cannot do anything else than 
follow nature. In ,the second sense of the term, the doctrine 
that m~l ought to tollow nature is irrational and immoral. If 
mall followed nature, for example, if he lived like the anima.ls, 
he ,wuld 1I1'Ound, kill, and devour other men as well as other ani-
mals. This is what seems to be in the ba.ck ot M11~'s mind llrhen 
he says that to follow nature is irrational end immoral.'S In 
this section of his essay-there seems to be no indication that 
there might be an essential distinction between man and brute, 
animal and rational animal.)6 If such a distinction wer~ made, 
then man could follow nature, ~ nature, and thus not act like 
a brute beast. 
For Mill, the evils of nature are a tremendous dirf1. 
culty. The terror of a hurricane, the destruction of a flight 
or locusts or a flood,'7 the fact that "a large proportion of 
all animals should pass their existence in tormenting and devour-
34 Iblg., 6.4_ 
)5 ~., 65. 
. li 36 l.J2.M\., 55-65. 
37 ..l.l21a., 30 .. 
t 
12 
• 
ing other animals, ,,38 that these a,nimals "have been lavishly 
fitted out with the instruments necessary tor that -purpose; their 
strongest instincts impel' them to it, and many of them seem to 
have been constructed incapable of supporting themselves by any 
other food."39.-all these0henomena bewilder Mill. Theonly 
answer to these difficulties he sees in the fact that God must 
be finite. "If we are rlOt obliged to believe the animal creation 
to be the work of a demon, it is because ~e need not suppose it 
to have been made by Ii Being of infinite power. lt40 This, th.en, 
is where Mill's consideration of nature has'led him, namely, tG 
Ii finite Godl 
The only admissible moral theory ot Creation is that the 
Principle ot Good OAooot at Onae and altogether subdue the 
powers of evil, either physical or moral, could not place 
mankind in a world tree from the necessity of an incessant 
struggle with the male:t'1etnt powers, or make them always 
victorious in that struggle, but could and, did make them 
ca,pable ot carrying on the fight "fii th vigour and' '\Iiri th '1'0-
gressively increasing success.41 
Mill believes that of all the religious exnlanations 
of-the order of nature only one, the theory that God is finite, 
escapes being contradictory in itself and to the facts it at-
tempts to explain. Mants duty, Mill suggests, consists "10 
rj 
38 Ibid., 58. 
,I: .39 .IJa1g. 
40 ~. 
41 1121Q.. , .38. The emphasis is Mill's. 
13 
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st(nding forward a not ineffectue,l auxiliary to a Being of" ~er­
fect beneflc~ence.ft42 In other words, Millts God needs our help. 
Faith in such a God Hill considers much better adapted for nerv-
ing man to exertion "than a vague reliance on an Author of Good 
who 1s supposed to be also the author of evil." In fact, Mill 
thinks that men who have been strengthened and supported by a 
trust in a superintending Providenoe have really believed in a 
finite God.43 In some cases they do not state this belief openly) 
in others they do not themselves realize that they so believe. 
It would be tar beyond the scope of this present paper, 
in someway or other, to attempt to answer the difficulties which 
John Stuart Mill has seen. However, we might indioate one pos-
sible solution to the problem he raises of sutfering'in animals. 
First ot all, let us remember that the advantages and benefits 
which animals, as a whole, enjoy because they are endowed with 
sensation seem to surpass by tar thtlt pain that this or that ani-
mal oeeasionally feels. AgaIn, the very nature of sensation 
~fould seem. to neoessitate the 'Possibility of pain. An excess of 
pleasurable sensation is frequently the cause of pain. It would 
42 .ll'Wl., 39. 
43 ~., 39, 40. There we find this: "Those who have 
been, strengthened in goodness by relying on the sympathizing 
support of a powerful and good Governor of the v;orld, have, I am 
satisfied, never really believed that Governor to be ••• omnlpotent 
They have always save~ his goodness at the expense of his power.-
~--------------~ 
14 
require a eantinual miracle on the part of God to give animals 
a sense nature "h.ich, on the one hand, could enjoy pleasures, and 
.on the other I could never SUrreT 'Pain in that sense nature. Ani ... 
mals have no right to such a mlratle, since, as a matter of fact, 
they have no right to their very existence. Their existence is 
a free gift from God. Lastly, we do not know how much pain 
animals surfer, but it would seem to be less than tha.t of human 
beings. Animals which lack an intellect would seem to be unable 
to collect the pain that he.s passed, or to foresee the pain of 
the future. We know from our own experience that the anticipa-
tion of pain is frequently harder to bear than the actual pain 
itself. 
In his third essay on religion, entitled BTheismtt , Mill 
rejeets several proofs for God's eXistence, finally admitting the 
probability of the proof from. the design shown in the universe. 
But Uill argues that design means contrivance or means to attain 
an end, and this, he says, proves the finiteness of God. At 
first glanee Mill's argument is appe&ling. 
It 1s not too much to say that every indication of DeSign 
in the Kosmos is so much evidenoe against .the Omnipotence 
ot the Designer. For what is meant by Design? Contrivance. 
the adaptation of means to an end. But the necessity tor 
eontrivanee--the need ot em,loying means--is a consequence 
of the limitation ot ,ower. Who would have recourse to 
means it to attain his end his mere word was sufficient? •• 
Wisdom and contrivance are shown in oversoming diffieulties, 
and there 1s not room for them in a. Being for whom no dif-
ficulties exist. The evidences, therefore, ot Natural The-
ology distinctly imply that the author of the KoaDlos worked 
lS 
• 
under limitat1ons; that he was obliged to adapt himself to 
conditions independent of his will, and to attain his4,nd. by such arrangements as those conditions admitted ot. 4' 
From this la:st argument and from what has gone before, 
there 1s not much danger 1n mistaking Mill's position. That he 
held that God 1s finite can be stated with certainty. It would 
seem worthwhile to say something about the discussion of contri-
vance and design quoted above. In one short paragraph we cannot 
hope to solve Mill's objections completely, but perhaps we can, 
at least, indicate one approach to solv1ng it. Mill's position 
boils down to this' God i8 not omnipotent because He has to use 
contrivance or design, means to attain His end. However, we may 
well inquire what 18 the end ot creation from God's viewpoint. 
Is it something already attained by God, or is it something yet 
to be attained? If we hold that God's goodness 1s the end in 
ereation, Mill's difficulty seems less ot a difficulty. For 
thus on God's part He has perfectly attained this end .inee He 
a::'lways possesses entirely His own divine Goodness. Onejthe part 
of creatures, however, this end, the participation of God's 
goodness, 1s yet to be attained. On their side, then, there can 
be and is eontr1tance, means to attain their end. It we reeog-
n£aeithat all eontrivfmce 1s on the part of creatures striving 
to attain their end, and that God, so to speak, has forever per-
I.: 
Fee.t Iy 
44 ~., 176, 177. 
-16 
attained His end, then we can agree to Mill's meaning of ~esign. 
our eonaluslon, however, does not lead to a finite God but rather 
to a God who 1s omnipotent. This, in brief, would seem to be the 
barest outline of one possible solution to the objection. 
In the latter part of his essay on "Theism" Mill again 
reverts to the difficulty about the evils in the world. Again 
his solution 1s that God must be finite, the Creator RIess than 
Almighty.- In making h1s Deity imperfect, M1ll escapes what 
seems to him an insoluble problem, or rather, a downright contra-
diction. It is the impossible problem of reconciling infinite 
benevolence and justice with infinite power in the Creator of 
such a world a,3Mill daily saw about him.45 Although this 11mi te~ 
God of Mill's sidesteps eertain difficulties, it is not antirely 
free trom inconsistencies. The fact of limitation in God implies 
some limiting agent. In one r>la,cw46 Mill suggests that this 
limitation 1s due either to the material with which God has to 
work or to His limited knowledge and ability. Both of these re-
plies, however, would imply that there is something more ultimate 
than God. They .thu.s raise more difficulties than they solve. We 
can .ee from the following conclusions of Mill that his answer 
is ·liot entirely satisfying. 
, (: 45 Il.'!is1.) 186. 
46 X12~g., 174. 
t 
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These, then are the net results of Natural Theology on the 
question of the divine attributes. A Being of great but 
limited power, how or by what limited we cannot even conjec-
ture; ot great, and perhaps ail;i;mited intelligence, but 
perhaps also more narrowly limited than his power: who de-
sires and pays some regard to the happiness of his crea-
tures, but who seems to have other motlv'!s of aetton which 
he oares more for, and who can hardly be supp~sed to h~ve 
created the universe for that purpose alcne.4 
Whereas Hume might be called the first draftsman ot the 
modern theory of a finite God .. and Mill, its first great develop-
er, the American, William James, was one of its best popularizers 
According to James, God in the religious life of the common run 
of men 18 "8. superhuman person who calls us to co-operate in his 
purposes, and Who furthers ours if they ara 'Worthy. He works in 
an external enVironment, has limits, and has enemies_"48 
James's theory of a finite God was but a logieal out-
come from Mill's theory. In tact, James dedicates his work, 
PrAglitism, to Mill with the following words: "To the memory ot 
John Stuart Mill from whom I first learned the pragmatic open-
ness ot m.ind a.nd whom my fancy likes to picture as our leader 
were he alive today*"49 In A P1Yll,~stiQ Vnivers! James states 
his ?osition for a finite God in unmistakable terms, thus show-
J r 
1909i~ 
t1~ .. 
47 
48 
124. 
49 
~., 194. 
William lames, A flur!li§t1; Vn~IftrS!, New York, 
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WheJl .lou )(111 aalc! ''bat the notion ot Ood's o_lpoten .. 
DlUst be ,iWD up, it God 18 to be kept al a "11110u. ob-
.,.nhe wa. '''-17 acouratel1 l'1Cht; ,..t 80 Pl'eftlflnt 1. 
the iaz,. aoraua tbat idly baunt. the repon or God'. __ ! 
tbat 10 ai.ple and trutbtul a .. ~. was .e.Mll7' ',...'8a. 
a8 a parM_: 004l __ lt •• 8&14, not be t1nite _. I ..... 11eYe v.l tu onq God wor'tt.,' 0 '. __ DI1 be t1n1te!A 
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.1 •••• bas so_ ""bat- harsh worda to sa1 about tIM 
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"a pre tent 1 oua a ••• " AIld. he further declares: -It .an8 1 •• 8 
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Itban noth1J:ls. 1n its pompous robe ot adject1 ....... 62 .1a •• otter. 
jpra.-t1sa as a lubatltute tor the pretentious sbut ot the scho-
Ilastlc. • Be turns bi. lack on ~he intellectualls' po1nt of ... le .. 
~to8ether. .. 'lo· .. t does he tum? M 'God's 1ft hi. bea .... ll; aU t .. 
~1,ht w1 th the wor14!' --DaIS '. the real heart ot 70Ul' theolol1. 
~d tor that 70U De.d no rationalist definitions."S3 
In 1\18 book Dt. !V"'Ia. It. 1t"14mM IIll1tt.lIQ1 
~8JIl.I ,"cop1 ... "he praeti .. 1 De.ds and exper18a_ .ot rel1&10l1. 
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scholalt1c.. Ev1l 1a •• pbat1cal17 1rratlO1'la1. ..11 1. a paN 
abOlI1Jlat.1on to the Lord. en allen 'QD!'eal1t7. a .at. ele_nt. to 
be 110uped ott and n.pt.4. and the .... 17 ._01'7 ot 1t, 1t ,01-
6e .1"'., IZIIIIt& ••• lSl. 
53 1ld4. 
64 . Wll11aJa .1"', Dt.1tn'U'. 9t~a.Ia.OH IIPllt-
ellee, II •• York, l~. 615. "AIq't ~ raer  ow •• l .... ., wl1 
do. 1t =111t be 1&r, •• Doqh to truet tor the l'.lUt atop. It 
... 4not be 1Dt1n1t., 1t need not be 8011t&1'1." 
20 
• 
sible, wiped out and fOrgotten. w55 For James" as tor all the 
other finite God theorists, the moral and phys1cal evils present 
1n the world are the real stumbling block. We will see more of 
this in Chapter IV. For the 'oresent, let l1S be content to see 
the conclusion which James reaches in his work, A plurali§ti, 
Universe. It is in this book that much of his thought about a 
finite God is contained. 
The line of lee,st resistance, then, as it seems to me, both 
in theology a.nd in philosophy, is to acceptt along with the 
su;:>erhuman consciousness; the notion that it is not all .... 
em.bracing, the notion, in other words" that there is Ii. God, 
but that he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or 
in both at once.50 
Such,1n brief, is a partial history of this theory of 
a finite God in English-speaking countries. It was suggested by 
Hume, developed by Mill, and po?ularized by James. Laurie, MeTal 
gart, and Rashdall are some ot the modern philosouhers who have 
carried on the theory. Many of the same theories, problems, and 
solutions that ha.ve been considered in this chapter will come 
up again in a study ot another modern philosopher, Edgar Shef-
field Brightman. 
55 llli., 130. 
56 James,' Plurl11stts Universe, 311. 
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CHAPTF..R II 
PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 
Edgar Sheff1eld Br1ghtman was born Sept~mber 20, 1884, 
in a Methodist parsonage in Holbrook, Massachu~,;etts ~ 1 .At Brown 
University he reoeived the A.B. and A.M. degrees. He continued 
his studies at Boston University, where he received a theolog1ca 
degr&e in 1910 and the doctorate in 1912,. He was Ii follower ot 
the absolut1sm of Royce for a While but was later converted to 
James' pragmatism~ It was wh1le at Boston Unj.versity that he 
came under the 1nfluence of Borden Parker Bowne, one of the fore 
most American philosophers ot his day. Soon he turned to Bowne' 
personalism although he took a more empirical approach than Bown 
did. Brightman was v&ry emi'hatic about seeking a coherent a::e ... 
count ot experience. "In h1s criticism ot other ph11osoph1es 
the emphasis is on their failure to ta,ke all aspects of exoer1-
anae coherently into acco1rnt. Personality 1s aff1rmed to be the 
k~y to rea11ty."2 
'''.:.' 
" 1 Edgar S. Brightman, "Religion as Truth,," Qonje,mD9-
l:IJ:l:, seJ:i1rU ';theol.2sY. This art1cle gives detaIls of the autho 
and h1s ear'y lite. 
, 'I: 2 Walter G. Mueller and Laurence Sears, Ih!. I!@v!l$'P-
mentot American Philosophy, Boston, 1940, 510. 
~l 
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Protessor Brightman has written much ahout God. A mere 
disconnected survey ot his books irill impress one vIi th the 1m·oor .... 
t8llce he places on theisnu 'fhi P;:oblem of God, The Ftnding .Q! .Q.Q.g It 
Is God A Pet§on?, Religious Value., P,rson!ltty ~ R!lbgion, 
IMoral ~, and his most recent book, A Ph!l~S9Dhy ot Rel1gtgn. 
In read1.ug these bocks one is struck by the earnestness and sin-
cerity ot this man in his quest for truth and for a solution to 
some of the problems ot lite. His treatment ot God is always . 
reverent, and his "approach to the problems of human exnerience 
has always been philosophical rather than theological.-' Reason, 
then, 1s his method of approa.ch. 
The practical reason 1s reason; and no amount of respect 
for conscience or myst1cal experience or experimental 
method or strong personalities can justity the thinker 
in being satistied with what he knQws
4
to be irrational--
that 1s, contradictory or incoherent. 
IProfessor Brightma.n sees no contra.diction between faith and 
reason. He relies on both; the two are necessary. 
It fa1th is not to contradict 1tself or known tactl. it 
must be reasonalbe. A faith .contrary to reason" {to use 
Lockets expression) i$ a faith in the self- contradictory, 
that 1s, the impossible and the unreal.' 
.3 Brightman, "Religion as Truth," 53. 
4 lW,., 5A·. 
S Edgar S. Brightman, .An Introductj.olJ. !2Ph11osophI .. 
New York, 1925, )24 • 
. !: 
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ndar the guidance of reason and in the 'footstens of the great 
hinkers of th~ ages, Professor Brightman begins his search tor 
God. 6 
In Chapter V of his book, The Proplem 2t Goa, entitled 
tfThe Resultant Idea or God .. " Professor Brightman investigates the 
nature of God. He gives a lengthy t!"finition of God and, then 
elaborates on this definition. The following chapter is called 
-The Evidence for God." Here he considers and nroposss several 
arguments for the existence of God. It is true that it is often 
convenient to use some workable definition of God before actually 
proving His existence. However, to consider in detail the nature 
of God and to give a tall definition of Him before considering 
whether or not He actually exists, seems very muoh of a ease of 
putting the cart before the horse. If God does not really exist, 
or if we do not know He eXists, how can we explain His nature? 
Vi'hat need really 1s there to bother about the question of what 
6 Whether Professor Brightman realized it or not, an-
other philosopher centuries before him had mapped out reason as 
the foundation and groundwork of his philosophy. Back tn 1264 at 
Thana. wrote 1n his SB.! Contra Gentile!! "It is necessary to 
have reoourse to natural reason to which all are compelled to as-
sent. ~ ~.Q., I, 2) In another place (g.,g., I, 7) he treats snaci 
fic.lly the prOblem the.t Professor Brightman he,s oonsidered above 
namely, the relation between faith and. reason. It is interesting 
to note that their oonelusionsare the SSl!Uh Truth is one and can 
nevely,be self-contradiotory. Or as St. Thomas puts it, ItSince 
therefore falsehood alone is contrary to truth, it is impossible 
tor the truth of' tai th to be contra.ry to princi.1)les known by 
na. t~ral reason. ft 
r __ ----------------------------~ 
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• God is unless we know that He is? We think it more logical, the , 
to consider first Professor Brightmants treatment of the exis-
tence of God and then the nature of Professor Brightman's God, 
a:S seen from his definitions of Hlm. 
We should mention in the beginning that Professor 
Brightman has a criterion byl,chtch he wisheS to test all proofs 
for Godts existence. It iSI "the standard of whether they are 
based on a consideration of all the facts •• 7 The author gives 
six evidences which he considers proofs for God's existence. Be-
cause ot the limits of this paper we will not be able to cons1de 
them in the detail in which we would like to treat them. Since 
they do directly affect Brightmants concept of God Himself and 
indicate the way to a finite God, we must give them some atten-
tion in this study of God's finiteness. Our a.uthor summarizes 
them thus. 
.. 
Tn.a chief evidence for God, as I see it, may well be sum-
marized under six heads. the evidence of the rationality 
of the universe, the evidence ot the emergence ot novel-
ties, the evidence of the nature of personality, the evi-
dence of values, the evidence of religious experience. 
and the evidence of systematic coherence. To some extent 
these fields overlap; indeed, they must if they all tkKe 
in the whole of experience from differing points of view. 
I do·not present them as finalities but s1.iD1y as the 
best conceptions I have been able to find • 
7 Edgar S. Brightman, Ib! Problg .91 Gog, New York, 
1930j; 148. 
a ~. 
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Looking at Brightman's proofs for the existence of God, 
we will see that all of them lead to his position of a finite God 
The first of our author's "evidences H for God is the rationality 
of the universe. Concerning this proof , he says: "Whatever shOll'S 
the universe to be rational, shows it to be what one would exnect 
from the handiwork of a supreme. mind. Jf9 Brightman admits that 
ratione.lity is a very general term and· declares that a ra.tiona.l 
order in the universe does not necessarily imply such a God as 
religion worships. However, he claims that an irrational uni ... 
verse would exclude the possibility of a God, that we must show 
the universe to be rational if there is to be a God. What Pro-
fessor Brightman means by rational universe is not, of course, 
that the universe as a whole is eapable of reasoning. Rather, 
he means that it is a universe which gives signs of order and 
that this order, in turn, must have come from a mind. lO One of 
his proofs that the universe is rational is the followings 
The tact of interaction among things implies a. 11.-'l'li tary 
and ra.tional ground of interaction. All soience assumes 
that the universe is such a system of activity that any 
change anywhere implies changes elsewh!re; and these 
changes occur in accordance with laws. 
9 l.:Qisi., l4S. 
10 ~., 150. Thus he says, HDespite the problems 
raised by Heisenberg and others o'J.r cosmos rem&l,ins an ordered 
whole. And its rational order must be everlasting. ft 
11 llli, •• 149. 
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• Brightman's conclusion is that the universe must be thoug~t of as 
one rational and eternal system. Thus he is led to God, but atil 
"this does not yet give us a complete God, but it makes God in-
tellectually nossible.-12 There is no indication that this God 
is infinite. In fact, -imperfections" in the order of the uni. 
verse, for example, earthquakes, tornadoes ete., as we will see 
la:ter, convince Professor Brightman that this God must be finite 
His second proof ror God's existence 1s the emergence 
of novelties. The author explains what be means by this evidence 
To say that novelties emerge is to say t~.at new properties 
appear now and then in the universe which cannot be re-
garded as mere recombinations of what preceded them in time. 
Many believe that lire has p~operti~$ so utterly different 
from those at inorganic matter that no mere combitlat1on 
of inorganic substances could produfje living sUbst8.£ces 
unless there vrere 8. creative POWQ:t! in the universe. ' 
He regards it as certain that consciousness is a novelity with 
properties totally different from those of unfeeling and unthink-
ing matter. In spite of the apparent wastefulness of life and 
the vast amount of seemingly unnecessary inorganic 'matter in the 
universe, Professor Brightman sees that "there is far more con-
tinuity and plan in the novelties that arise than could possibly 
12 I'91d., 150. 
13 l12i..s1., 151. 
2f! 
be accounted for by mere blind ch,f:,nee. "14 Hf:J claims tha.t faith 
in a personal God is a far more intelligent a.nd less blind faith 
than "faith that chance could ryroduce life and mind and $001-
ety and genius and art and religion without any guidance by pur-
nose."15 Th~ appeal to mere chance is an unpardonahle philoso-
phical lin. Brightman explains why: "It assumes a rational ef-
fect with no cause but chance." The emergence of novelties not 
only nolnts the way to a personal God. but to a finite God also. 
It is also to be noted that the viev;, of a fil1ite God 
develop~d in the previous chapter is far more compatible 
with this combinatiqn of waste prodigality with purposive 
advance than is the traditional view of an omnipotent and 
benevolent oreator. 16 
The entire study of emergent novelties has led in each 
of its asY)eets to God as the most reasonable eX'olanatlon 
of the facts of experience, and, I may add, to Ii creative 
but finite God. l ? 
The third main type of evidence for God, acoording to 
Professor Brightman, is that of the nature of personality. In 
his discussion of novelty this proof has been anticipated to a 
certain extent, "for eonscious')ersonality is a most striking 
novelty in a world ot impersonal atoms and force. h1S E01ltever, 
14 llli", 151. 
15 ~.J 153. 
16 l.l2.1S.. , 154 
. I: 
,. 17 ..IlUA. 
18 lb~g. 
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our author judges that the unirueness of the problem of personal-
ity requires a special discussion. He sees that "in various 
ways the existence of personality makes the existence ot a per-
sonal God reasonable." One proof of this Professor Brightman 
gives as follows. 
Personality is ::rganic to the universe ••• Sinc.H? mind and 
things are in one constant process of interaction and inter-
change, it is reasonable to suppose that the whole v-·orld is 
one kind, and that, the kind that we experisnce directly in 
consciousness •••• Thus the fe.at of oersona11 ty points to a 
world beyend our personalities, but essentially of the same 
kind, that is of thought and action and ex~er1ence, yet on 
a cosmic seale. To this cosmio experience ••• we give the 
nlLl1e God.19 
Brightman sees another proof of God's existence in the 
cause ot consciousness. This cause of consciousness, he says~ 
ftsurely carmot be a reduced and stupid seventh cousin ot con-
sciousness} it must be a closer relative. more like a father 
than aeousin.20 In other words .. consciousness must emerge and 
be produced trom a source that can really explain it. For Pro-
fessor Brightman, tis. cosmic eonsc1o'usness 1s the only conceivable 
source ot evolution which can be clearly seen to be adequate to 
the facts. a2l God is but another name for this 'cosmic conscious. 
ness" ot which our author speaks. In this way, the na:'ture of 
19 ~., 155, 156 • 
. .I: 20 lW,., 157. 
21 ~. 
r:~#--------------------------------------~ 
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personality takes Brightman to God; but since God's personality 
is "essentially of the same kind, that is, of thought and actio 
and experienoe" as ours, He can hardly be said to be infinite 
any more than we are infinite. 
The fourth type of evidence for God is that from value. 
Professor Brightman sta.tes: "In man's experience we find not 
merely facts ot: sense and of self-consciousness, but we also fin 
22 
values." The existence of values among men, like the existence 
ot: personality, 1s a fact to be explained. Moreover, man is not 
alone 1n experiencing values. 
The world ot nature behaves like human nature in this re-
spect: it acts as though it, too, were living for some 
purpose. Man strives towards ~~ds which he values, nature 
strives towards ends, such as the development ot law and 
ordel!", life and mind, which it seems to .iue. Thus Vie 
may consider values i~~nature 1n connection with values 
in human personality. ' 
Professor Brightman recogniZes the many t:aots in nature which 
evidently show signs of purpose. They "all point to the presenc 
of a purposive power in the universe. R This purnosive ?o~er is 
none other than God. However, a difficulty arises. It is the 
difficulty ot explaining the presD@ce of evil in the world. Evil 
seems the strongest argument and. most concrete evidence against 
the e~1stence of God. As we shall see in greater detail in Chap 
f 22 lla!J!. 
23 .I.,b1d., ISS. 
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tel' IV, this difficulty is for the present author surmountable. 
Professor Brightms.n himself offers at least three weighty solu-
tions to this problem 1n his work, ~ froRlem ~ God. 24 He 
holds, too, that his theory of a finite God accounts for much of 
the evil in the world. There are simply certain things and even 
over which God does not have complete power. Evil is one of 
these things. Thus Brightman concludes that "theism gives the 
most rational explanation of the facts of our value experience, 
both of its evils and of its goods.,,25 
Concerning the fifth main type of evidence, that from 
religious experience, Brightman declare •• 
It is true that a religious experienoe, taken by itself, 
cannot well be used as evidence for the existenoe of the 
divine ObJect toward which it is directed; but t.:ken in 
connection with the rest of experience and with our total 
world view, it may be regar~gd as strong empirical con-
firmation of belief in God. 
This tifth evidence tor God is a su~plament and confirmation ot 
the other evidences. The author we are treating seems to imply 
t~t this proof from religious experience lea:ds to a finite God 
He, does not expressly state this in Ihi Problem ~ ~ but sinc 
his four previous proofs of that book brought Brightman to a 
fip1~e God, this strong "empirical confirmation" would seem to 
lead to the same conclusion. la lh! findlng ~ ~ Brightman 
· (: 
,. 
24 ~., 160. 
25 Ibid, 
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explicitly states that religious experience leads to a finite 
God. 
Wha~t sort of God, then, is the God to whom religious 
experience leads? In the nature of the case it must be 
Ii finite God. No possible experienc~7could possibly 
reveal unlimited and absolute power. 
Certainly some will disagree with the l1ne of reasoning in the 
a:bove statement. They might ask whether Professor Brightman 
is not confUSing the experience with its object, God. Does it 
nec •• sarily tollow that the object of our experience, God, has 
to be finite because our experience is finite? Is it not pos-
sible to have Ii finite experience of an infinite God? To say 
that God. is finite because our experience of Him is fin1te,seems 
like saying that the ocean contains just one quart of water 
because we only have Ii quart-size di~per to measure it. 
The importance our author attaches to his sixth and 
last proof for God is evidenced by his following statement. BAll 
ot the other types of evidence reduce to and must be 3udged by 
th~ standard of the evidence trom systematic coherence, which is 
26 1.lUJ1., 161. 
;.. 27 Edgar B. Brightman, ,Ii' g;t;ndW M.QQ.d, New York, 19)1," 131. The text continues. ft aod reveile"dTn ex;>ereince, 
then, is powerful enough to lead the world toward higher levels, 
yet it we are to believe the evidence of experience, not power-
ful enough to do it without great ditficulty •••• The God suggeste 
.by r,lig1ous experience, then, is a spirit contending agalsnt ob 
stacles." 
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the sixth and last type. w28 • The ultimate reason for belief in 
God, then, is simply because such a belief provides the best 
solution to the riddle of lite and experience. These are Bright 
man f S own words .. 
Renoe, the best reason for believing in God is that aocep-
tance of the proposition that he exists and manifests him-
self in the ongoing of experience leads to the most con-
nected and eoherent view of our experience as a whole •••• 
Reality is better understood as the life work of a Supreme 
Person than in any other way. Every possible v.1ew leaves 
us painfully aware ot the limitations at human knowledge 
and of the need for further insight; but this view has the 
a~dvantage2Qf pushing thought as tar as it can go toward 
the light. '1 
One reason why all of Professor Brightman's proofs for 
the existence of God ooint the way to a finite God seems to be 
thei~ lack of metaphysieal depth. Very laudably, they sta:rt on 
the emnir1cal plane, yet they neVer r1se any higher. These proo s 
of his do not seem to penetrate beneath the surface meaning ot 
things and get to the heart ot their true significanoe. Certain 
ly they do not probe deep enough into the whole problem of be1ng 
As_far as they go, they may be good; but that 1s prec1sely the 
difficulty: they do not go tar enough. They stay on the empiri-
cal level and cannot rise to anything higher than a finite God. 
That" too, seems to be why they appea:r so uncertain. 
28 Brightman, Ib&t Probl!m .2.t.2.24, 161. 
29 ~., 162. 
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• There 1s a note of hesitance that characterizes all six 
of Professor Brightman t s proofs. Such phrases 8, s nmakes God in-
tellectually possible,n)O ncontributes to belief in God,n)l nhas 
led ••• to God as the most reasonable explanation,n)2 and "makes the 
existence ot 11 personal'God reasonable, .l' flEH,Un to betray a lack 
of conviction in the certainty of the proofs offered. Evidently 
Professor Brightman thought that probability as to God's existenee 
was all that was possible. In a later book, P!lftonp.llty J,l.l£ 114-
~igion, published in 1934, Brightman acknowledges that his evidence 
for God gives only probabillty« 
From a strictly logical standpoint, therefore, knowledge 
about the real world a~nd God is not absolute, but merely 
probable. It is useless to pretend that scienee or philo-
sophy can bring absolute proof--muoh Ie.. disproof--of God. 
But with all the limitations ot his reason, man can see 
that faith in til personal God has a degree of probability 
which exceeds that of rival theories. J4 
Turning now trom a consideration of Professor Bright. 
man's proofs for God's existence and how they led him to a finite 
God, we oan take til brief look at several definitions of God given 
by our author in his various w·orks. The following appears in hi. 
30 ~., 150. 
)1 ll2.1s1., 151. 
32 ~., 154. 
j: 33 l.J2ig., 155. 
~ 1 3. F4gar S. Brightman, PIlSQDflitI ~ Religion, New Yor.ft.,934, 63. ......---::-;;; . 
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book, lh!. froblem 2! God,! It is the most com:Jlete defini.tion 
y;hich we will find in any of Brightman t s works, E:.nd a,l though 1 t 
is lengthy, it is worth Quoting in its entirety. 
·Qod is a oonscious neTson of perfect good will. He 1s 
the source of all value and so 1s worthy of worship and 
devotion. He 1s the creator of all oth.r persons and gives 
them the power of free choice. Therefore his purpose oon-
trols the outcome of the universe. Rispur1)ose.l.nd his 
nature must be inferred from the way in whioh exnerience 
reveals them, namely, as being gradually attained through 
effort .. difflculty, and suffering. Hence there is in Godts 
very na.ture something which makes the effort and pain ot' 
life necessary. There is within him, in addition to his 
reason and his active will, a passive element whieh enters 
into every' one of his conscious states, as sensation, in-
stinct, and imuulse enter into ours, and constitutes a 
problem tor him. This element we call The Given. The evils 
ot lite and the delays in the attainment of value, in so 
tar as they come from God and not from hum.an freedom, a.re 
thus due to his nature, yet not wholly due to his deliberate 
choice. His \'rill and reason acting en The Given produce the 
world and achieve value in it.,5 
Although Professor Brightman calls the above paragraph a "defini-
tion", it is obvious that he does not mean a definition in the 
striot sense of the word. It is rather a descriptive definition 
or a description. 
For a personalist such as Brightman, one of the most 
imoortant ideas in the above description ot God is that He is a 
?erson. Personality is the key note ot personalism. We find a 
good p'assage in Professor Brightman's l!. Goa A {!e.u2nl which in-
dicateS his stand on the meaning of personallty.,6 The eternal 
, J: 
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reality in the universe for the ?ersone11sts 1s persona11~y. 
Wha t we call matter and energy tL'1d their laws are simply the 
functioning of a cosmic personality. The relation bet.leen matter 
and spirit, then, is really a relation between sn1~1t and spirit. 
Brightman admits that this persone,11st view of the universe 1s 
"& hypothesis to be tested in relation to the rest of our ex-
perience and thinking.·,7 What does our·author mean when he says 
that God is a consoious Person? He himself remarks. IITooa,11 
God personal is to hold that the ~metions of conscious Dersona1 
ity are present in him to the highest possible degree. These 
functions are feeltng, thought, ~nd wil1. U,8 This t:ype of per-
sonalism which Professor Brightman holds seems, at times, to eom 
very close to pantheism' 
The important thing is the agreement of ~ersonalists on the 
belief that the processes of the universe are all forms ot 
.conscious purpose; that evolution 1s the striVing of God 
himselt; and that every material thing as well as every 
person has some place in that purpose.';9 
The note of God's perfect good will seems also to be 
essential to BrIghtman theory of God as seen in the lengthy des-
cription of God given on the previous page, Our author holds 
36 Edgar 8. Brightman; 11 Gog A Perlont, New York, 
1932, 12. 
37 ~. 
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tha.t God 1s the creator, Md he maintains that man receivesf'ree 
will as a gift frmlJ. God. Brightman elso mentions God f $I purpose 
~md His nature. He states that these "must be inferred froIll the 
way in which experience reveals them, namely, as being gradually 
attained through effort, difficulty, Emd suffering, ,,40 Here y,;e 
must say again that there is danger in confusing "the way in 
'lfJhich experience revee.ls" God IS nature and pur~)ose with the na-
ture v.nd pur?ose of God in themselves. The.!l.i..I of' "xller1ence 
with us finite creatures is always going to be finite. It,there 
fore, we confuse the ~ of our knowing God with the n~ture of 
God in Himself, we cannot helt) reaching El fini t·e God. We will 
have .01'& to say about the pur~ose of God in a later chapter. 
Without stoPPing to consider it in detall, we should also men-
tion the peculiar el.ement of lhi Given in Brightman's descriptio 
of God. Th!i 1U.ven, 'IA'e must remember is a passive element con-
tained in Godta very nature. We will have ,to turn to this inter 
nal element in God in Chapter V to understand Professor Bright 
when he otters his explanation ot evil. 
Brightman sums up the descriptive definition of God 
which we have been considering in the following terms. 
'God is 8. person -supremely conscious, supremely valuable, 
and supremely creative, yet limited by the free choices 
,1.\ 
40 Brightman, Ib! ?robJ.em !!.t..Q2sL 113. 
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of othet persons and by the restrictions 11'i thin his Olli'1l 
nature.41 
For Brightman, then, God is definitely lim1t9c, a finite God. 
Three important notes ot his theory of God are: (1) that God is 
a. person--and tor Brightman consciousness 1s an imlJortant P81"t42 
of personalIty; (2) that He is the creator) (3) that He is su-
premely good or valuable. 
In a later work, Protessor BrIghtman explicitly in-
cludes some qualities 1n God v,rhich he had not previously men-
tioned. Thus in Per!onality ~ n§l~gl2n our author says; 
God is an eternal conscious personal spirit, infinite in 
duration. selt-existent, 11mited only by the eternal reason 
and content of his own personality and, ot course, by lJ 
such conditions as he voluntarily imposes unon himself.~ 
Here we see that Brightman mentions the fact that God is a spirit 
a:s well as a person. Since He is infinite in duration, He has 
existed from 8,11 eternity. We will see later, however, that 
according to Professor Brightman, God is affected by time even 
though He 1s eternal.. Here,too, the note of self-existence makes 
its a:ppearance. As we go on, we shall see thllt 1s a note which 
1s extremely important. In the present definition, Brightman 
sees God as limited by the eternal reason and content of his own 
personality. This 1s the same astht Given mentioned already. 
·1: 41 ~., 113. 
Y 1 .. : 1 .42. Cf. Edgar S. Brightman, !. PhtlQsophx Ii.!.. lde§lrl, New 
or.a.'I 928, 'f, 
~ 
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God i$ also limited by "the conditions he voluntarily imposes an 
11imself.- ·This last limitation of God would include "the free 
choices of other nereons· which Brightman considered a limitation 
of God in one of the foregoing definitions. Thus, in /?ermon§11tx 
Ang Religion Brightman augments but does not contradict or deny 
what he held in his previous work. 
In his latest work, A Ph1loso'ghlof R~11gion, Professor 
Brightman stresses exceptionally strongly the note tbat God's 
will 1s tinite. "Striotly we should speak of a God whose will is 
finite rather than a f1.'llte God. 1t44 In 8nothero'8.ssage in this 
same work, Brightman gives this note of Godts finite will as the 
distinguishing marl( between theistic finitism and theistic ~b-
solutislIU 
The two forms of theism agree in the propOSition that God 
1san eternal, conscious s?irit, whose will is unfailingly 
good. The difference between the two may best be brought 
out by saying that theistic absolutism is the view that the 
will of God r8~es no conditions within the divine experience 
which that will did not create (or at least approve)t where-
a::, theistic f1nitlsm is the opposing view, namely) that 
the will of God does faee conditions within the di?ine ex-
perience which that will neither created nor approves.4, 
ThiS, it Vlould seem" 1s an excellent su.m.mary of the two positionlH 
43 Brightman, P~Is2na*~ty ~ ~~1~gl2n, 97. 
44 Br1ghtman, A Phl:J.o~crRh;{ .Q.! a(~l!iii.on, 337. 
): .45 lW.-, 281, 282. 
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Perhaps it v~")uld l".['ve "teen better, hc'!)':ever, h,:.d Erightmf:.n in the 
Ei.bove ~untt",tion substituted the phrase "or at Iee.st pemi t" in. 
nIece of "or at Ieest approve." lieee.use of men f s free ... will, God 
]erm,1 t§ sins. 'f'e can r:~(Y'ter say God P!H?l'oves sin. According to 
Professor Brightman) theistic [,bsolut1sm tends to overemphasize 
the perfections cf God and of cref'bu'es; theistic fini tism, on 
the other hand, raise! qu.estions about the perfections of the 
46 creator. 
Professor Brightman's proo.fs for the existence ot God 
seem naturally to lead him to a. fin! te God. In his der.ini tions 
of God, he crms1stently defines God &8 ~. fin! te Person. Al-
though he may emuhesize tr,is or t~t cheracterist!e in di,fferent 
definitions, there is one note to be found in 811 of them, name-
ly, that there ls limitation within the very nature of God. 
Finally, in his latest book, Brightman locates that limitation 
in God as coming from His finite 1Ftll. To understand a little 
more about this finite God theory of OU.!, author, ~re shall con-
sider in our next chapter his thought on some of the attributes 
of God. 
• 
CHAPTER III 
THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD 
We learn the nature of a particuls.r being from that 
being's actions and operations. The sa.me is true of God; from a. 
study of His work in the universe a.round us we learn something 
about God Himself. From the effeets of God's actions we know 
the actions themselves; and knowing them, we attribute certain 
qualities to His nature. An attribute, we know, is a quality 
that 1s due to something. It is characteristic of the nature or 
this particular thing. The attributes of God, then, are those 
qualities or marks -which are to be ascribed to God, precisely as 
God. It is of the very nature of God that He be thus and not 
otherwise~. Now the attributes ascribed to God will differ ac .... 
cording to this or that theory about God. In this chapter, five 
attributes which are important in Brightman's theory ot God will 
be_C'onsidered; for these attributes 131ainly show that the natu.re 
of-his God is finite. The first attribute to be investigated is 
the perfection of God. l 
Professor Brightman declares: "God, then.. is by def1ni 
.j: 1 BrightLl'Uln, Personal:!, ty !And Re11g;ion, 76. 
40 
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tion the ens RerfecyissiW1&Q, the most perfect being. ff2 He con-
sults the etymology of the viord "perfect" and finds that perfec-
Jiio means "con:wletion. ,,3 Something perfect, then, would be some 
thing finished or completed. But is it possible for God to be 
completed? Certa.inly nott Thus our author concludes th&t God 
is not perfect but rather infinitel:! perfectible. 
There is no perfected person whose being is completed and 
whose perfection 1s finished! but there may be a person 
w'bose will is unfailingly good end whose task is eternal 
and inexhaustible. Such a person would 'be divine; his per-
fection W'ould not be elf 5.nfini te completeness but an in-
finite perfectibility.4 
In A ?hl1gsophy .2! Bmligion Professor Brightman SllInS up the tote. 
teaching of his earlier works on this ?oint, saying: ~en# how-
ever, we S11bstitute for ~ertection the ideal of the inexhaustibl 
perfectibility, we have a ooncept 8lJ1)licable to both God and men 
and adequate to man's religious needs.~5 
It is true that perfection does have the etymnlog1.cal 
meaning of ·oompletionff or totaliter rac~Ym' To s~y that this i 
the meaning of the word when a.-pp11ed to God, hOTl/ever, is to mis-
understand word usage. EtymologicEllly, m!:l111;ta¢;k"1.1re means to mak 
by h,nd, but ~'ho would say that is the common mean:tng of the VlO 
! f 
2 .Ih;tg. 
:1 Ibid., 78. t: 
4 l.1!lA., 79 
5 Brightman, A Phil~!opbI Qt R!l!g~og, .340. 
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• today? Today it has more the mea.ning of making by m.achinery. 
?erfection, according to standard dictionaries, can mean nsuprem 
;;;xce11ence· or "'the cond! tion,. sts,te, or quall ty of being per-
fect or free from e.l1 defect. n v;,bile perfect ce,n mac,n "in the 
state of complete excellence; fref? from any flaw or im:)erfection 
of ql:1B.litjr,. or age,in, "hnv:lng all the ess€mti£.l elements, quall 
ties or characteristlcs."6 Taken in this sense, "perfection" os 
be applied to God without im?lying any perfectibility or change 
in Him. It 1s not perhaps e..n absolutely suitable word to des-
cribe the Deity, but then what human word is? 
An error much more serious than that of confusing the 
etymology of e word with its true meaning is Professor Brightman s 
confusion of perfection and perfectibility. "The divine perfec-
tion, then," Brightman holda, If!., an Infini te series of ;:)erfact ... 
ings.?erfect1on means perfectibility.a7 
Really, Professor BTlghtman understan1s that perfee-
tion can be c'ms1dered in two radically different ways: 
'1'hare is the im:lersonal p'3rf~cti()n of a. circle that is 
'. 6 James Augustus Henry ~ful'"ray, (~d.) A New ~~li~~ 
ntlt10nary .QJl Hi§torig§l P;r::wgiple;, Oxford, 1928, VII, 82-S4. 
7 Brightman, ~ Problem sr ~, lS3. 
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perfectly circular, or of a mountain, the proportions of 
which are perfectly satisfying. There is also the personal 
perfection of a blameless character and a thoroughly ade-
quate intelligence engaged in the inexhaustible creation 
of ne'?! forms of spiritua,l life. S 
Impersonalperfeetion is "icIly regular, snlendidly null." In 
it "there 1s no life, no change, but magnificient dee,th." Per-
sonal perfection, also, has changeless, eternal, perfect laws to 
which the good will always conforms. But in addition to this 
type of changelessness, there is the essentia~l note of perfec-
tibility.9 We can agree with Professor Brightman that 'oerfection 
of human beings on this earth does involve a not.e of perfecti-
bility. We learn this from our every day contaet with persons. 
No one is so perfect that he cannot improve. But can this fact 
of perfectibility, taken as it is from experience with human per-
sons, directly be applied to God? . 
Perfectibility im~lies the potential power to receive 
a perfection. For example, if there were potentiality in God, 
He would have to receive a perfection trom some other being than 
Himself. Consequently, that being would be more perfect, more 
ultimate than God. If this second being Were perfect in the 
sensfi! of perfectible, it too would have to receive any new per-
fectldn from a third being, and so on, to an infinite series. An 
. j' S Brightman, lll! Ftnd~ni 9I. Q29., 1.30, 1.31. 
9 ~. 
r ~------------------------------------------~ 
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• infinite series, however, does not give a rational reason for the 
existence of any existing perfectible being nor of the whole 
series. This whole question is, perhaps, best seen from the ex-
ample of contingent beings. 
We see around us thousemds of contingent be1r~gs, thing! 
that are capable of existing or not. .At one tim.e they dtd not 
exist; then they came into being; and, perhaps, in a short while 
they will ceB.s;e to exist. The ultimate answer 1'01' their exis-
tence eannot be from other contingent peillgs, for th~YI too, hav, 
to look outside themselves for the reftson of tbe1r existence. 
Nor is an infinite series of contingent beings an answer. This 
fails to answer the question of how the infinite series came int 
being. No, the answer must rest in a being that must neces.ar11' 
exist, a being who 1s existence. This be1ng we call God. And 
this God is Pure Act .. that is, the Principle of being, smpremely 
a:ctlal, capable of reee1vL~g nothing from any other beulg eim· 
ply because He contains in His very nature the actualization of 
existence and all p'arfect1ons conn~cted t'.f1 ~h existence.. Ther~ 
il no room for imperfection in Him.. He has no :;)Otency to be ac ... 
tuated; hence, God, the Ultimata, 1s all 'Osrfect. Professor 
Brightman contradicts himself 'when he makes his God u.ltimate and 
yet perfectible; his theory of a fin1t~ God is an ~~ttenr,)t to get 
out' ,tir this contradiction. 
~-' --------------------------~ 
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to wonder whether Professor Brightman hold,s that God ..u. infinite 
He states the argument for this position well. Then we come to 
a passage which looks very much like a pars,dox: "The truth and 
value of divine infinity can hardly be Guestioned, and is not 
questioned e!en by those who call God finite, when the finitenes 
supposed is wi thin God and not imposed by anything externs.l to 
him. ft12 This, we shall see nres~tly, is really the position ot 
Brightman. He holds that God is finite-infinite, that is, fi-
ni~e in some respects and infinite in others. 
This doctrine is expressed in Personll~~Y ~ R!lig;on 
in the chapter, "The Finite .... Infinite God." However, the author 
had pro"Oosed the idea of a finite God in a "Jrevious work, lb.! 
Probkem 2[~. There he introduced his idea of The Given as 
an internal limitation in God: 
The Given must be within the divine consciousness and not 
external to it; for otherwise it does not explain why God 
has so much genuine difficulty in expressing his ideai~pur­
poses, combined with so much control and achievement. ~ 
In.lh! 11nd~ng Q! QQd Brightman repeats this idea that God is 
tinite, "limited by an uncreated 'Given' in his eternal nature 
as well as by his will.,,14 But experiences teaches Professor 
Br~g~tman that the divine will can solve every problem and bring 
12 ~., 75. 
13 Brightman, The Problem £!~, 182, 183. 
14 Brightnisn,Thi l1nding S1l. Gog, 13. 
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• ~alue out of every situation, no matter how evil it may be. 15 
ThuS Brightman calls God the Controller of TllS given.16 
In his latest work, A Philosophy ~ Relig~on, our autho 
reiterates that In! Giyen is "first, eternal within the experi-
ence of God and hence had no other origin than God's eternal be-
ing; and secondly, that it is not a nroduct of will or created 
activity.nl7 For Brightman, then, God's finiteness does not me 
that He began nor that He will end nor that He is limited by any 
thing outside Himself. "Strictly we should speak of a God whose 
will is finite rather than a finite God) for even the finite God 
is absolute in the sense of being the ultimate source of all ar 
ation. n18 Our author gives a good summ~ry of his pOSition on a 
"finite-infinite God in A Philolonhy ~ Religion: 
God's will, then, is in a definite sense finite. But We 
have called him "finite-infinite." Although the power of 
his will is limited by The Given, arguments for the objec-
tivity of ideals give grounds for the postulate that his 
will for goodness and love 1s unlimitedl likewise, he is 
infinite in time and space, by his unbegun and unending 
duration and by his inolusion of all nature within his es-
perienee; such a God must be unlimited in his knowledge of 
all tha.t is, although human freedom a.nd the nature of The 
15 ~., 13. 
16 Brightman, A Pbilosooh"l .QL Religion, .336. 
17 ~., 337. 
): 18 ~. 
Given probably limit his knowledge of the precise d~ail 
of the tuture. 19 
How did Professor Brightman arrive at this position of 
a "finite-infinite'" God, and why does he maintain it? The 1'01 ... " 
lowing passage will, J1'believe, sta.rt us tOVl,rard a. partialanswert 
A real infinite must be definite, although the word means 
"boundless," a. real infinite must have bounds. To say that 
the real God is infinite, then, means that he is the se1t-
existent source of all being; but it does also mean that 
he contains and recognizes limitations. If he didn't he w 
would be formless, meaningless, lawless28haos--a Greek in-
finite instead of a religious infinite. 
In the first book of The MetauWiig" Aristotle nar ... 
rates that most of the earliest philosophers regarded prinCiples 
of a material kind as the only principles of all thinls. Thus 
Thales held that the first principles of everything was water; 
Heraclitus ot Ephesus, fire; Anaximenes believed it was ai~J and 
Empedoc1es said it was a combination of the above three plus 
earth. 21 
Some of the early Greeks seem to identity the infinite 
with something material. Because the infinite is in the cate-
gory of quantity, Aristotle says'that substance or quality or af 
19 Ib~g., .3.37. 
20 Brightman, Pet,onalitx ~ R'bigioS, 75, 76. 
21 cr. Aristotle, letluhI§iQ!, I, " 9S3b, 984& 
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22 tection cannot be infinite. Professor Brightman cites Plato 
~lebul, 27D) in warning against a blind devotion to the word, 
'infinite,- and especially against usupposing that there is any 
intellectual or religious value in the idea of an utterly un-
limited infinite. w2) 
The Greeks, then, whether or not they believed that 
the infinite was this or that matarisl principle or, on the othe 
had, denied that the infinite was to be identified with mE~otter, 
did agree on this, namely, that the infinIte was indeterminate. 
As such it had infinite Dotentialities and was, therefore, imp 
teet. Because the infinite was undetermined, it was also unin-
telligible. Professor Brightman seems to confuse the infinity 
which the Greeks thought of as a formless chaos with the formal 
infinity that is one of the attributes of God. That is the rea-
, 
Ion why Brightman says that God ha.s to contain limitations. 
Othen;ise, " ••• if he didn't [contain limitation~ he [God] would 
be formless, meaningless, lawless chaos.w24 It is only if we 
rea~ize that Brightman has in the back of his head the idea of 
Greek undetermined infinity that the foregoing words have mean-
ing. That is why he says: w, real infinite must be definite •••• 
-
22 Aristotle, Phy,+q" III, 6, 2078.. 
23 Brightman, Personakity and Be11gion, 75. 
24 Ibid., 76. 
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a real inrini te must have bounds •• 25 It '\ivas partially to pro .... 
teet God from being considered a ·meaningless chaos· that Pro-
fessor Brightman proposed his theory of a "finite .... infinite" God. 
His theory, he believes, is a rational interpretation of the em-
26 pirical facts. 
Brightman admits that God is the hself-existent source 
of all being •• 27 If, however, God is selt-existent, unbegun, 
and unending, He is the necessary being that we have seen from 
a consideration of contingent being. We saw that there had to 
exist a being which contained in its very nature the reason of 
its ovmexistence. This being we call God. It is Godls very 
nature to exist. He is neither from determining matter, nor is 
He matter determined by torm. If God, then, is self-sufficient, 
He 1s Pure Act unbounded by any potency, any restrIction, any 
limitation. Conseq:uently, He is infinite. It is simply be-
cause the divine act of being is not received in anything, in 
other words because God is his own self-subsistent act ot being, 
that He is both infinite and uerfect. Definiteness imDlying fi-
niteness, then, is the second attribute which is characteristic 
25 ~., 75. 
26 J:.:Q14., 97. 
27 lll1!!., 75. 
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of Brightman t s theory of God. 
Two other points which are contained in Brightman f s 
thinking about God md which clearly indicate that God is finite 
are change and time. From what we have already seen of Bright-
man's notion of the oerfectibil1ty of God, it is evident that 
he believed God could really change; for without change God could 
not grow in perfection. Change and time are closely allied. Our 
author treats them as twin sisters, and we shall attempt to fol-
low him in this. 
In a chapter on "The Patience ot God. in his book, ThJ 
lindWI 9l..Q.2si, Professor Brightman inYestigates 'whether the 
time in which this patience ot God is revealed is a revelation 
of the very nature of God himself, or whether God, the Eternal, 
is elevated above all time. ,,28 In spite of the fact that there 
is much philosophioal thought that points toward God as an utter-
ly timeless being, Profess::'or Brightman thinks that an utterly 
timeless eternity i~ 'much .asier to adore unthinkingly or to 
diseuse verbally th~ to comprehend intelligently.- In the fol-
lowinc pas,age he tells what he means by the word -timeless·, 
~o be timeless mems to lack all of the attributes of time, 
to have no before or after, no change, no activity, no 
pa.st, no present, no future. Offhand it would seem that 
28 BrightmCn, In! linSkng ~~, 125. 
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an utterly timeless being could not possibly stand in any 
causal or significant relation to the Ylorld of time. Any 
being that causes temporal changes would itself ht~e to 
change or act in order to initiate those changes. 
Brightman admits that there is a type of timeless ob-
jeot which we tind in our temporal experience. He gives the ex-
ample ot the conception of a triangle. However, he sees that 
ff a timeless mathematical triangle has no cause and oan have no 
effects •••• is eternal and power1ess. ft'0 God cannot be timeless 
as mathematical principles, or universals, or the laws of logic 
are timeless. 
A god, to have value either as a metaphysical explanation 
or our real experience in time or as an ob3e~t of religious 
worship, must it is true, have a character which is the 
same at all times and which neither begins nor ends, but he 
must also stand in active, dynamic relations to the changing 
world of experience. Unless there is activity and time 
within him, he stands in an utterly unintelligible relation 
to a world ot activity and time. How could an utterly 
changel~ss being generate change"l 
Not only is an absolutely timeless eternity inconceivable 
but if it could be conceived, it would fa,!l to explain the 
time-order and the part that is played by time in every 
eXperienoe and every tact of the Teal world. It would ren-
der the who 1'2 oosmi'c evolutionary process super.fluous and 
meaningless.;;J, 
Profeslor Brightman considers in some detail the rea-
29 l.Ri.S.. , 126. 
. J: )0 ~., 127. 
31 ~:g,g. 
32 ~., 12S. 
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,ons for time in God. Whether God is an omnipotent Creator or 
• fInite Creator, -in either case, we must think of him as act 
in time; in either ease, creation actually occurs only when the 
creature begins to be.-'l Our author points out that this is 
true whether we believe that the world is an eternal creation or 
a creation a~t SOMe definite tIme, -for in both cases, one or 
infInitely many acts of creation are performed in time, and in 
bOth, the time process has to be continually conserved and sus-
talned.·34 Revelation also points to time in GodC "This is es-
pecially true it the coming ot Christ had any signitlcence tor 
God.,,3S The God ot history is a God for whom historical changes 
.r. real, a God 'who somehow brings his will to expression in 
human life through them •• 36 Lastly, religious experience defi-
nitely paints to a theory ot God which admits time and change in 
God, so Protessor Brightman belie".es: 
-
A real change occurs when man turns from selt to God, tram 
human sin to divine righteousness. That change, it reli-
giou. faith be at all warranted, is not merely a change in 
man's attitude, but also a change in God. God eould not 
rightly treat the repentant and the unrepentant, the indif-
ferent and loyal, the hostile and the loving,a~l in the 
lame way ••• Hence, things happen in God's experience. time 
1s real tor him, he looks ahead with patience to what his 
children have not yet beeo~e.'7 
33 Ib,S&., 128. 
34 XbJ,d. 
35 lW., "129 .. 
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• Our author sees one serious objection to this tempo-
rs11st1c view of God, namely, that it necessarily detracts from 
the divine perfection. But with his understanding that perfec-
tion means perfectibilIty, as we explained above, Brightman can 
without contradiction hold that tL~e is essential to God. 
For Brightman, however, this view of time as a real 
•• sential aspect of God does not deny his concrete eternity. 
denies only his abstract timelessness and it alone makes his 
.terni"ty even approximately intelligible.')S 
The divine eternity means God's endless duration (duree 
reelle) ••• There must be something eternal! tor timeless 
nothingness could not have produced a wor d. The ditfi-
cult!es with endless duration, then, are difficulties of 
our imagination which inhere in any ~ossible view of re-
ality.39 
Professor Brightman's temporal1st1c view ftrecogni~es that God 
transcends time by his eternally perfect goodness and his e 
knowledge of all that 1s knowable (it it is worth knowing).n40 
According to Brightman's theory, this knowledge would have to 
elude the future choices of free persons. To sum up, his ~osi­
tlon 1s that God is etarnal in duration, goodness, and knowledge 
but that -time is essential to the very nature or God and is a 
37 .l.9.1s1. , 129, 130. 
38 niS.., 131. 
.39 Ibid., 131, 1.32. 
40 Ib1&1., 1)2. 
-
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condition o~the divine perfect1on. ft4l Belief in such a God ls 
"~oral necessity tor freedom; a religious necessity .for redem-p-
tion. a metaphysical neoessity for creation; and an ideal nee.s~ 
sity, it God's perfection be perfectibi11ty.ft42 , 
Without delaying longer on this question ot change and 
time, WG may say that Protessor'Brightmants position springs fro 
the notion that to etfect something 1n time the CE.use must be 
a:ctually in time. This is certainly t~le of contingent caus@s 
which work by motion. The element of time 1s essential to their 
activity. However, time does not seem to be essen.tial for acre 
at!ve cause. Here the effect oceurs simply ~r the willing of th 
creator. This will act can be from all eternity. It has to be, 
if God is changeless. The terminus or object of that volition 
does not have to exist actually trom all eternity as a separate 
being, but only at such a point when God wills that it should 
here and now a:etually begin to exist. This 1s possible because 
the world tollows not trom the nature ot God, but from the tree 
will of God acoording to the determinations, including tho •• ot 
time and place, decreed by God through His intellect and will. 
The object of God t , volition 1s eternal in the sense that God 
sees this particular being trom all eternity and wills that it 
should exist. 
L 
;6 
We have seen that it was the selt-existence ot 4 God 
which led to our oonviction ot His infinity. This self.existenc 
Professor Brightman readily admits.43 Taking this common ground 
of Godts selt-existence, let us see 1f Godts immutability cannot 
be demonstrated. Selt-existence, as we have already seen in 
this present chapter, is the prerogs:tive of a being whose exis .... 
tence is not contingent but necessary. This neeessary being is 
in a state ot complete actuality. We eall this being God, the 
Pure Act in whom therei! no potency whatever. Having no potane 
then, God is incapable ot any change; tor a change is the actual 
izing of some potency. If God 1s selt-existent, He must be un-
changeable. 
From the immutabilIty ot God it 1s only a halt-ste1' to 
his eternity. Whatever is unchangeable, and thus, without suc-
cess!pn or ehange~ without beginning or end, cannot be measured 
by time J for time is the measurement of -betore- and latter" in 
movement. Beca~se God is immutable, and because time has to do 
with cha.ngeable beings, time Q!Nl2:k be "essential to the very 
nature of God., The measurement ot God's duration is called ete 
ni ty. Boeth1us defines etern! ty as .ntem.nabil;t§ vitae !9Ja. 
42 ~., 133, 134 • 
. ,I.: 43 Cf.. Brightman, P,ff0 !l111 t:y; and Rf,l;tg;ton, 75, 76. 
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investigation 1nto the apparent limitation of Godts power-. 
First of all, let us investigate what the meaning of 
the word g;p1notence 1s. Does it mean the power to do anything 
and everything? Or rather, does it mean the power to do every-
th1ng that 1s absolutely possible, in other words, everything 
that does not co~a1n & note of self-contradiction' In his book 
Tll! ... .Pl:2bl.em ot ~ Professor Brightman seems to indicate thet, 
for him, omnipotence means the power to do anything at all, . 
Tradl tionally God. has been thought of as self·caused (.sa]'UH! 
.lYl.) and as pure actuality (a.ctU& RUrYI)--a being completel~ 
leIr-determln-t~d w1.th no potentl:i'rl ty for f1.l.rther develop-
ment ••• lf God be regarded as a wholly self-caused will, ~e 
are·brought into serious difficulties. Can God choose 
whether his nature shall be in time or not? The old oues-
tions haunt us, Can he make a round. triangle, a two which 
multiplied by two will produce s1x, a time prior to his 
aVrIl existence? Manifestly not ••• His nature as a conJcious 
being sets limits to his will; God must be t1nlte.47 
It is important to note that the conclusion, -God must be fi-
nite-, follows because there seems to be a limitation of God's 
power. 
In lb.!. FillSU·ng 91. .Qgg, our author seems to hedge some-
what on what he has said in !hI Proplem ~~. He seems to re-
treat to at sort or middle way by denying that there 1s a real 
concept of omnipotencel .The concept of omnipotence as a power 
to do everything is absurd) but when it is conceived as a power 
'J,: 
r- ' 
rr-----------. 
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• to do everything possible-- to Ido the doable,' as Bowne,said--
it is a limited 61~ipotence."48 It is better, Brightman says, 
not to claim the power to do everything when some things s,re ad .... 
mittedly impossible. 
A person is said to be omnipotent, however, it he is 
able to do everythIng that is possible, absolutely speaking. 
Now a thing is slid to be possible if the predIcate can be joine 
to the subject in a proposition. A thing !I ?osslble if there is 
no contradiction in its intrinsic notes. We see an example of 
a true possible in the proposition: The man is tall. There is 
nothing about tallness which is contradictory to the idea ot 
manhood. The predicate can be correctly joined to the subject. 
On the other hand, an example ot something imnoss1ble would bel 
" 
The man is a horse. There are contradictory notes in the actual 
beIng; the predicate cannot be joined correctly to the subject) 
so this second proposition is not possible.49 
The only thing opposed to the notion of being is non-
be1ng. A non-being is likewise unable to fulfill the definition 
ot a ,possible since at the same time it includes the idea ot'a-
.1niand .w:m.-l1IW. Such a "thing" <toes not come under the scope 
of divine omnipotence, therefore .. because it is not "doable". 
, ,I: 
48 Brightman, lb! l1n~lng g! God, 180. 
'0 ct. i. %., I, 25, 3. 
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It is selt-contradictory. It is more correct, then, to say that 
such a thing cannot be done than to say that God cannot do it. 50 
Thus the proot tor Godts omnipotence a~gain stems from 
the selt-existence of the divine being. The foundation of di-
vine power is the divine nature which, because of its self-exis-
tanee, is infinite. Subsistent being, however, is not restrict-
ed to any particular type of b~ingJ it has within itself the 
perfection of all being. Thus whate.er can have the true nature 
of being is contained under the ~~ssibles. And in respect to 
these, God Is said to be omnipotent. 
With this understanding of omnipotence, which seems to 
be the most satisfying, and with the realization that this at-
tribute flows from· the self-existence of God, we can now trace 
briefly the steps which led Professor Erightman to his oonvic-
tion that God is limited in power. The first step has already 
been given. Brightman's misunderstanding of the meaning of omni-
potence. Secondly, our author stresses the pOint that his idea 
of God best coincides with the facts of experience.'l Looking at 
natu'e, Brightman conclude. it is the work of a power, but that 
this power is working under great difficulties52 
i51 Brightman. Thf! Pr9l:il.~ug g! 80d, 125. 
52 Brightman The llndtnJ At~, 117. 
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• In the third place, Brightman speaks more explicitly 
in referring to the evils in the nhys1cal world around us, 8the 
presence of earthquakes, cyclones, and disease germl in the worl 
He argues that if all that we regard as hindering good is, from 
God's standpoint, tor the best, then our knowledge ot good and 
evil is so imperfect that we cannot s~rely pass judgement at all 
anout what is mean by either good or evil~ He sees a more seri-
ous and more tar reaching danger in this further problem. 
If our hy?othesis requires us to regard every natural disas 
ter, every disease, mental or phYSical, every item of ap-
parent waste or futility in evolution, every dinosaur and 
imbecile, as really a perfect means to the perfect end, 
ought we not in tairness to the limitations of our experi-
ence and knowledge rather to avow agnosticism than theism'S 
Professor Brightman admits that human sin 1s a suffi-
cient answer tor some evils. But he sees "that the universe eon 
tains ob.taoles to the will ot God besides the obstacles due to 
human sin.' Since these obstacles delay the ful1"illment ot good 
ness and beauty, they cannot be due to the will of God. S4 In-
timately bound up with this whole problem 01" the evil forces ex-
isting in the world is the two~fold problem ot God's love and Hi 
powe~. Brightman's stand cannot be mistakenl "It we ask our ... 
sel.e~ why a loving God lets such forces loose in his world, we 
. j: 53 Brightman, Pusonll! tz And Re11,t9U, 96. 
" 
54 Brightman, lbl ltnd1ng £t God,ll!. 
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• have no answer as long as we hold to d1vine omnipotence. n55 His 
conclusion 1s that the concept of God's love or that of His powe 
must be revised; it 1s the latter which Professor Brightman 
chooses to amendl "On our view, God is perfect in w1ll, but not 
in achievement; perfect in power to derive good trom all situ ... 
ations, but not in power to determine in detail what those situ-
ations will be. n56 
Professor Brightman's theory of the attributes of God 
does point to his theory of a finite God. Thus his conclusions 
picture God as perfectible, finite-infinite, changeable, 
eternal yet affected by time, and lastly, limited in power. To 
understand more tully the nature of God according to Professor 
Br1ghtm.an and the limitation of God's power, it seems best to 
consider next the problem of evil. It is principally this prob-
lem that has led our author to his belief 1n God's lim1ted power 
It 1s this problem that is at the heart or his theistic f1ni-
tism. 
55 ~., 153. 
56 Brightman, lbi Prob~1m st ~, 1)7, 138. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PROBLEM OF GOOD-AND-EVIL 
Belief in God raises sevtral difticulties. One ot the 
most perplexing problems for Professor Brightman 1s the problem 
ot good-and-evil. He maintains that it is a two-told problem, 
Dnot the problem ot good or the problem of ev!l, but the compoun 
problem ot go-od-and-erll •• l this problem 1s Brightman's chief 
reason for holding that God is tin.it.. It a satisfactory answer 
can be given to this weighty and difficult question, Brightman's 
theory of theistio t1nitism will have to be revised. He det.r-
mined, as we saw in Chapter III, that the only reasonai}le solu .... 
tion to this problem at good-and-evil was the oonclusion that 
God's nature was limited. In this chapter, another solution 
will be attempted, a solution which will not sacrifice the omni-
potence and the dignity ot God. In treating Protessor Brightman 
on _this' matter, we will quote rather frequently from his latest 
book, .A. Philosophy' of Relig1on. This will assure us of being 
fair .1n giving our author's own words and his latest position 
andcQnclusions. 
: .; 
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• As we read through the works of Professor Brightman, We 
become aware that there is a common note underlying much of his 
thinking on this problem of good-aDd-evil. It is the note of 
optimism, the doctrine that everything should be absolutely the 
best. In The Finding of God we find him saying that God's ways 
are strange and not such a:s we would prefer if we were doing th 
choosing. "If God is the omnipotent being he is tra.d1 tionally 
believed to be, it is very strange that he has chosen the slow 
and cos;tly means of evolution for the creation of 11£e.,2 If 
God is conceived as limited within His nature, Brightman says 
that the strangeness 1s partially explained. "But it is still 
mysterious,. he adds. 
In Personality and Religion, he remarks that the ap-
parent waste or futility in evolution can hardly be regarded -as 
really a perfect means to the Derfect end.-' In other words) 
evolution is a difficulty agaiast the omnipotence of God pre-
cisely because it does not seem to be a perfect means to the per 
feet end. If we claim that it is a p~rfect means and therefore 
God is omnipotent, the author cla.ims we ought "in fairness to 
the limitations of our experience and kno'lNledge rather to avow 
2 Brightman, The l~nd1ni 9l...Q9.!\, 149. We should note 
that,Br1ghtmanall along assumes evolution to be an •• tablilhed 
ra.ct~: This "fact-, however, is still hypothetical of its nature 
) Brightman, P!l!2nalitI AD4 nllig~gn, 96. 
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agnosticism than theism,·4 Unmistakable throughout this whole 
passage is the underlying current that God has to use a perfect 
means to the perf'ect end if' He is omnipotent.. Hence Brightman's' 
conclusion tha') since He does not use this means, Gqd is, there-
fore, a limited God., S 
'Our author again reters to what he believes to be the 
imperfection ot· evolution in A fhtJAsophx .at l!!l~gism.· 
The means used 1n the evolutionary process were wasteful 
and cruel in the extreme, and for many millions of years 
leem to haVe served no intrinsic value. The tamous La Brea 
tar pits in Los Angeles, where mastodons, saber-tooth ti-
gers, and other animals perished, illustrate the suttering 
and futility which prevailed tor long ages in evolut1on~6 
The importance ot this imperfeetion in the evolutionary process 
is evident "if there is a God in control ot cosmio processes." 
Such a God would clearly be responsible tor the operation of 
e'''';ausal laws in na:.ture. It there are causal processes in na,tur 
which, apart trom human intervention, lead to evils or "dystele-
ologie8.l results. as 'Brightman calls them, then !tit is impossibl_ 
to -avoid' the qllest10n of God's responb1bi11ty for evil. ff7 Ac-
cording to Brightmanfs theory, th1s is only tl!ue it God is omni .. 
i , 4. Ib!.st., 96. 
5 Ill!; • 
. ,f: 6 Brightman, A P'b~J.os9RhX !JJ.. ReJ.;1i;10D.. 247, 248, 
7 IRig. 
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• potent, If' He Is in control of cosmic processes. The qu.estion 
resolves into a dilemma. Either God is omnipotent and the cause 
a! evilJ or He is finite, and something else--lh! G~v'n-- is the 
eause of evil.· F:i..rmly convinced ot Godts goodness, Brightman 
preters to believe in God's finiteness. The whole foundation ot 
this method, we must remember, is this' If God were omnipo~nt, 
He would by His very nature choose a perfect means to the pertee 
end. 
This theory would also hold for moral evil. If God 
were able to stop moral evil, He would. The best summary of 
Protessor Brightman's position on this doctrine of optimism 1s 
contained in 'lbJt Find1u(i o.t GQ.d., 1.n a chapter entitled,. inciden-
tally, -The Goodness of' God.- It is worth quoting in tull. 
Surely, if God were omnipotent beyond our poor power to 
conceive, he would have created a race of tree beings who 
would always choose righteously (as he himself, being also 
free, always chooses righteously), even though in theory 
they were free to sin (as he also 1s). There must be some-
thing in 8the nature of things. to render impossible the 
creation ofa race of free beings who would never sin, even 
though they were free to. If it were possible, God would 
have created them. The impossibi11ty must lie in the very 
nature of God, for if it le.,. merely in the created world, 
we should have to ask why God created such a world. There 
would have to be something in him which rendered suoh a 
creation the best possible--and surely he would always do 
,the best possible. This .something in himD is, a:gain, an 
aspect of The G1ven.' 
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• ~ay1ng aside the strange concept of a God who is free 
to sin, we may sa.y that the above pa.ragraph is a logical conclu-
sion trom our author's first premise. This first premise, how-
ever, seems almos·t to have been thrown 1n as an after-thought, It 
sort of selt-evident truth which hardly needs mentioning. What 
1s it? 'Burell! h! (God) "'22J.9. always !'l2 th~ la.u1 l!9ss1bl,.ft In 
the sense intended by the author, that premise is untrue. It 
means that God, it He were able, would have made the best pos-
sible world. But is this really correct, An omnipotent Goel 1s 
able to make a million worlds-... ll ot them, taken objectiVely, 
more perfect than the present one. Does not the following seem 
more correct. God by His very nature would ha.ve to make the best 
possible world, tha.t is, the world belt suit~d ~ B11 glv1nl 
PlAn;U in making it? With' the statement thus qUB.lified, the 
imperfeetions of nature can. be freely acknoli!ledged and still be 
expl.ined as the work of e. perfect God. Thus,although some thin II 
are imperfect, they are the means He has chosen &.S best in ac-
cordance with his ultimate end and purpose in creating this 
present world of things, 
Let us look at the problem for a moment from a field 
other than that of philosophy. This statement, namely, t~at God 
only has to create the world best suited to His dIvine purpose, 
'$hoti~d not be hard for Christians to grasp. Granted that God 
hadimade Brightman's -race of free beings who would never sin," 
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• 
would Godts goodness have been as foreefully manifested as it 
is under the actual cirCUDU£tances' There would be no Incarna-
tion, no Bethlehem, no Calvery$ Ar~ we not, in the long run, 
infinitely better ott as a sinful race v:ith Christ, than we would 
have been as a selt-righteous race without Him, come what may? 
Is it not at least conceivable that God crea.ted our race, even 
though He knew it ,~ould fallJ that He created it kno-w1ng it was 
the desirable means of showing His love and mercy by sending a 
Redeemer? What was God obliged to do, as a perfect Eeing' Cre-
ate a perfect world' No, rather, create a world perfect for Si. 
divine purpose; a world in the creation of which He, the Creator, 
committed no injustioe. Tha:t 1s all Godts nature obliged Him 
to do in creating. 
The further q,uestlon of why God created this present 
world is wrapryed in the unfathomable mystery ot God's nature and 
His dIVine purpose. We cannot hope to fathom God. Can the 
creature exhaust the Oreator' Can It being of limited intelli-
gence hope to comprehend a Being who is IntellIgence Unlimited? 
BrIghtman admits this hiaself as one of the faotors ot the mys-
tery of Goth 
, ~he mystery of God seems to be due to ~o factors. One 
factor is human incapacity and ignorance. We cannot pene-
trate into the heart ot ultimate ,reality; we cannot grasp 
, the full sweep of d1vine purpose. It is beyond us. We 
finlghtleam to understand ,more of it tor increasing aeons, 
yet stIll find mystery ahead. God's nature 1s inexhaustl-
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ble, and man's powers are 11mited.9 
• 
Wha:t must be understood, is that it is this false doc 
trine of optimism which is at the root of all of Professor 
brightman's thought on the problem ot goo.-and-evil. Unless 
this i8 understood, we will hardly grasp the true significance 
of his treatment of the problem. Once it is understood, we can 
proceed to a consideratIon of the problem itself. 
Analyzing evil a~s it is met with in experience, Pro-
fessor Brightman catalogues it into five typesl (1) a will that 
is more or less incoherent) (2) the intellectual evil of igno-
ranceJ (3) maladjustment; (4) incom?etence, L~d (5) the dysteleo 
10g1cal surd.10 Concern1n~ this fifth type, the author explains 
"A surd in mathematios is a quantity not expressible in rational 
numbersJ so a surd 1n the realm of value experienoe is an ev11 
not expressible 1n terms of good, no matter wha:t operations are 
performed on it. w1l A surd, then, is someth1ng which is entirel 
evil; there i$ no port1o~no aspect of good in it at all. This 
undoubtedly 1s the worst ot all evils, 
.. 
The other types may sometimes be superseded by internal 
development, an incoherent will may become relatively more 
;coherent, ignorance may be enlightenedJ maladjustments may 
be overcome by proper relationships; and incompetence may 
be lupplanted by skill. But a dysteleolog1eal surd 1s a 
I! 
9 lRiS., 164, 165. 
10 Brightman, A PhiJ.9sop):rv .9.t. n§J:~g1oIb 244 .. 245. 
70 
• type of evil which 1s inherently and irreducibly evil and 
contains wi~hin itself no principle of development or im-
provement.1 
For Professor Brightman, then, the question of ev11 
resolves ins elf into the question of surd ev11. Other evils may 
be eXplained away, but this one alone remains to point the way 
to Godfs finiteness. 1IThe problem ot evil in its most acute fo 
1s the question whether there 1s surd evil, and so,. what its 
relation to value is."l.3 But Professor Brightma!1 1s not clear 
about whether these surds actually do exist. 1tIt 1s debateable, 
he says 1n one place, whether there are dysteleologlcal surds, 
it is conceivable that such surds may exist.,,14 In another, "If 
there be any truly surd evil, then it 1s not in any sense an in-
strumental good; good comes in sotte of it, not because of it."lS 
From this hypotbet1cal thinking, our author passes to categorica 
conclusions without offering any really solid proof. He never 
actually defines surd evil in so many words. He gives examples 
of surd evil, but tails to pro",. that they are surd evil. Let 
us look at them. We will find the.t they are explainable in 
some other wa.y. 
11 ~., 244, 245. 
12 ~., 24" ·246. 
): 13 ~. 
14 1b1d.,246• 
-.5 Ibid. 
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• Take, for example, the phenomenon of imbeCility. Let us 
grant that imbecility may encourage psychiatry and arouse 
pity; yet,' if it be an incurable condition, there remains 
in it a surd evil embodied in the intrinsic worthlessness 
ot the imbecile's existence f.l'-.~ the sutfering ,,:hieh his 
existence imposes on others.}'t:> 
The prineiple mistake in Brightman's considertaion ot 
imbecility 1s his viewpoint. He is looking at the situation en-
tirely from this life. To astimat~ the condition rightly, it is 
necessary to consider the whole of man's existencG, bothbetore 
and after death. Without going into a disc'u!lsion of immortality 
tor that would be beyond the scope of this present inquiry, we 
must 88Y that it is only in the light of the next lite that the 
condition of imbecility can be understood. An imbecile, althoug 
his reason is lmdeveloped, Is, nevertheless, a man~ As a man 
he is destined for perfect happiness in the next life if he live 
a moral life and is baptized. Being capablt of no moral evil, 
sinee he is not responsible for his actions, a baptized imbecile 
is assured of Mt'miness in the next life. How, then, can Bright 
man speak of "the intrinsic worthlessness of the imbecile'S ex-
istence'" He has not followed his own stan(h~rd of taking into 
consideration. J!l. tke facts. He has limited himself to the 
pr"e,nt life. Certainly imbeCility, looked at in this light. 
oannot be considered a surd evil. 
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Evolution provides us w1 th another of BrIghtman" s ex-
amilles of surd evil. Already in this chapter17 we have quoted 
our author when he speaks of the femous La Bree. tar pits. Se 
states tha:t the remains of prehistoric animals found in these 
pits 1tlllustrate the suffering and the futility which prevs,iled 
for long ages in evolut1on. w18 Instead, do not the La Brea pits 
seem to be more an ev1dence ot Divine Providence? It is by ..... 
ot them that God has -provid.ed man with actual da.t& about the ani .... 
mals which inhab1ted the earth in prehistoric times. The dina .. 
saul', mastodon, saber .... tooth tiger end other extinct animals B.re 
not examples of the futility of evolution. They are, rather, 
examples of the tremendous variety and ingenuity of the Divine 
crea.t1ve Power, These a.nimals have adequately s.rv.d their Pllr .. 
pose if the memory of them and their remains are signs to mt.nkind 
of the power of God. There .1s no need for Qod to keep their 
species in existence. 'ben these animals existed, they served 
to give material praise to their Creato~. Even though they are 
now extinct.. the signs and evidences O.t' their former exist~nee 
gi~es like Draise to God. As for the suffering of these and othe 
&nicnls, that is ~nother vroblem. 
In a previous che:pter it was pointed out that surr~r1n 
J: 
17 cr •. above, page 65. 
is Brightman, A Pb412fpbY~ Be11g1gn, 248. 
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If animals was a difficulty tor John Stuart Mill. l9 We can only 
~epeat briefly in answering Brightman's ditt~iculty what we have 
tlready said to Mill. The advantages of sensation and the plea ... 
Jures animals enjoy through it far outweigh the psin tl~t is here 
lnd there felt. .Animals are tBr better otf having sensst1on, 
~ven though pain is sometimes occasioned by it, than they would 
)e without sensation. Agsin the pain of an1mals seems to be tar 
Less in· intensity than that of human beings. Finally, it would 
~equ1re a continual miralle on the part of God to give animals 
l sense nature which could en30y pleasures, anast!ll withold 
suftering from them. This miracle animals have no right to, 
sL~ce, in fact they have no rights at all. Only beings possessed 
'It intellect a.nd will hE-va rights. Neither does (lod owe this 
airacle to His own Justice or goodness. For these reasons, then. 
~rightlllan t s arguments for the fini tenes 5 of God baceuse of the 
sutf9ring in ~11mal$ appear to be invalid. 
the same may be said ot his arguments from ftth~ appar-
~nt waste or futility of evolut1on.-20 It evolution 1s tru~J 
md that still l·emains to be proved concl'IJ.si',ely,"'-indeed, it is 
,f such a nature tl't.at it ean never be so proved-.... even so, eV'olu-
;ion is not an indication of w~ste by the divine goodness. It 
. . ·1.:19 cr. ?at,ge 9 tr. 
i 20 Brightman, flrmODllttxJD4 Be11gton, 96. 
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• is rather an instance of the lavishness ot the divine wisdom 
which has lett for mankind a sign o.f Godin everything, "tongues 
in trees, books in the running brook, sermons in stones, snd good 
in everything •• 21 
Our consideration of Brightman's treatment ot the prob-
lem af gaod-and-evil hsCs advanced this far, We have seen the 
imoartance the author puts on the existence of surd evil) we have 
also seen his tailure to prove that there is such a thing 8S surd 
eVil. The tact of Lmbecility and that of evolution can be ade-
quately explained without the invention of surd evil. Does our 
author give any other exam?les of surd evil? This is what Bright~ 
man states .in a general way about the surdl 
What has been said about the futilities and the waste of 
evolution may be extended to apply ta all the Rsurd evil" 
which figures so prominently in the entire problem of' good .. 
and-evil. There seems to be evil in the universe so cruel, 
so irration~l, so unjust tha.t it could not be the work of 
a good God,22 
Moral evil can hardly be called surd evil and used as 
&. proof' for God's finiteness. Professor Brightman admits that 
Rmoral evils may be explained as a result of human freedom •• 23 
Surd evil, then, would be restricted to natural evil, which 
21 William Shakespeare, A,s lm! ~ I;t, II, 1. 
! : 
, 22 Brightman, A PGilosopUx ~! Reli~ion, 318. 
23 l.h!S., 260. 
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"?lould include pain, disease, death, earthq.uakes, and tornadoes • 
••• ,,24 But are these 'Phenomena so "inherently and irreducibly 
evil'" Let us examine them and see. 
The' possibility of pain in animals, vie have seen, is 
necessary if they are to enjoy sensation. The good sensation 
brings them far overshadows the evil of ?ain. This is also true 
of man, but th.ere is the added fact that pain in man ca..1'1 be the 
cause of a higher good. By suffering pain man is often forced 
to turn to God and to lead a good moral life B.fter he ha.s sinned 
There is no comparison in value b~tween the good tha.t results 
and the physical evil which occasions it. For both the converte 
sinner and the saint, pa1n can be the occasion of merit for the 
next life. Thus, far from being a surd evil, pain cam be a tre-
mendous beneti t to man. What "e he.ve said of 1')ain app11es also 
to disease. 
Death 1s not entirely evil either. In animals it is 
the natural result of their composit.ion. It is not the good of 
the individual but rather the common good of the species which 1. 
of prime impor.tance where animals are considered. Thus an indiv 
, be. du.l flLnimal can"and often is sacrificed for the good of the 
'f ~ 
group. We see an instance of this in certain kinds of spiders 
.. 
r~----__________________________ ~ 
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• does are also olassed by Brightman in the category of intrinsic 
evils. But wha.t is s. flood or an ea.!'thquake, a tornado or a 
storm at sea? Are they not supreme manifestations of the divine 
power. Man realizes his insignificant -power '?rhen he experiences 
the tremendous torce of a hurricane. He realizes that the dif· 
ference between God's might and his weakness illimitable. In 
themselves these phenomen.a. are but eVidences to man that an Al-
mighty God still reigns. In addition to this, they are Often 
the occasion of moral pur§;& t1on. FrecCuently in the wake of the 
natural disorders that upset our lives men aclmowledge their 
sinfulness and turn to God., This higher s~iritual good far sur-
passes any am.oun.t of physical evil. One soul alone 1s priceless~ 
In conclusion" vte can stDte that Brightma.n ha.s failed. 
to prove tr.at such a thing as surd evil exists. Every exam'i.)le 
of surd evil that he proposes can be explCined adequately in 
another way. His theory of surd evil has been the result of 
not adhering to his own standard of considering all the fa¢ts. 
Be sometimes limits his viewpoint to this life instead of judg-
ing by eternal values. At other times he oonsiders the evil of 
the individual rather than viewing the good of the whole of crea 
Again he remains on the mere physical plane, instead of 
viewing ~hings from the higher mOTal plane. His theory of surd 
'aviV: h~s resulted from a failure to see the whole question in 
pel'!,spect1ve. For this reason we must relect Brightman-s theory. 
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If we except his mistaken undertone of optimism and 
h1s acceptance of surd evil, we can agree that Professor Bright-
man hils himself gj.ven a rather aceurs.te answer to the objections 
arising from the problem of evil in the world. In one or his 
earlier ".forks, 1hl frobl • .s;t pod, he gives three explanations. 
First, much ot the natural evil is a wholesome discip11ne. 
suffering p'arlfies ::,nd obstacles strengthen the soul. Se~­
':rondly, moral evil is & necessary-consequence of the abuse 
of the divine gift of freedom. Thirdly, mu.ch that seems 
evil to us maY2~e tiue to the fact that Oed's purposes are 
unknown to U8. 
solutions to the ?roblem of evil. The first three of these seem 
to do a rather thorough job ft'ff e:!1.8wering msny of t~e d1fficultie 
of this problem. The three solutinns he enill!lerates arel (1) LIO-
ral evils may be explained 8.S a. rsS'ul t of human fre-9dom. (2) lfo4 
moral evils are sometimes viewed ~s & :m ... '1.ishrnGnt for moral (,vils. 
(3) Non-moral evils, if not pencd J may be regarded 6.S d.isciplin ... 
ary_ Let us consider each of there three m.ore in detail. 
The ext)lane.tion thE t mOl"1.1 evils result f'rom human 
freedom is a satisfactory one~ Frightman indicatee t1w.t ttmuch 
weicht may be granted to this ergumel'lt,,,26 Fh~ holds that Klmtfs 
f : 
Vatk.'s and Bosanquet's objeetions to n:U~l'lts free will are !. ~r1 •• q 
): 25 Bri.ghtman, ~ Prg:£\§1J :;:!.. God. 160. 
26 Brightman, A Ph!losonnz 2! R~b!glQn, 260. 
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~ and unempirical. H~ver, Brightman finds it hard to recon-
cile a saying from St. Paul that aGod is faithful, and will not 
sutfer you to be tempted above that which you are able," (I Cor., 
10, 13) with the tact ot human sin. Human freedom, then; while 
it explains much of the moral evil in the world, is not entirely 
satisfying for Brightmanl 
Nevertheless, human freedom leaves many aspects of evil, 
even moral evil, unexplained. Why are there in the nature 
of things, independent of human choice, so many temptations 
and alluresents to evil choices so utterly debasing and 
disasterou .. ' ••• Freedom, we repeat, explains much of the 
moral eVil, but it does not explain either the toree of 
tem-ptation or the debasing consequences of moral e\1i1. 27 
It we explain the torce of temptation as a result.of 
the concupiscence of our tallen nature and even the existence 
ot a devil, and finally as a means God uses to increase our me~­
"it, we see that this objection is rea,sonably answered. The be .... 
basin, consequences of moral evil may be explained as the result 
of our rebelling against Almighty God and violating the integrit 
of our God-given nature. Human freedom, consequently, stands OU 
.:s the essential answer to the problem of moral evil. 
Brightman rejects the second solution ot evil, that 
no~mpral evils are sometimes a punishment for moral evils. His 
t ' 
reason tor entirely rejecting this theory is that lIit is repug-
27 ~., 260, 261. 
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nant to the ethical sense ot modern idealists.-
Even criminology has repudiated the motive of punish-
ment in favor of the reformation of the criminal. Sblll a 
good God harbor resentment? noes perfect love punish' FUr-
ther, the llnjust distribution of nonmoral evils, both in-
trinsic and instrumental, makes it imposs1ble to suppose 
that any consistent desire to punish affords an explanation 
ot more than a few evtl ••• ,The whole theory.ot punishment 
as a solution to the problem ot evil collapses of its own 
weight. 28 ' 
Our author oocas1onally injects a bit of divine reve-
lation into his philosophy to augment his arguments. There is 
an instance of it here. 'This crude theory ot punishment was re-
jected by th. writer ot the book of Job and by Jesus (according 
to John, 9# 3),_29 The citation of the gospel reters to a oure 
Jesus worked on a man blind since his birth. Christ.s disciples 
had asked Him. whether the man himself or his parents had sinned 
that the man was afflicted with blindness, Our Lord replied tha 
neither the man himself nor his parents wer'S being t)unished for 
sin in th1sb11ndness. Rather, Christ explained, the blindness 
had occurred in order that Godes works be manifested through 
this blind man. There~on Christ healed the man ot his blindness 
From this single instance it 1s hardly correct to say that Jesus 
rej.~ted the theory ot punishment. Our Lord Himself told the 
pa1al~tl0 at the pool of Bethsaida to sin no more lest something 
): 28 ~., 261, 262. 
29 ~. 
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worse happen to him (John, 5, 14). • The classic exam~le of pun-
ishment for sin 1$ found in the Book ot Genesis, chapter lS, 
verse 19. There we read of the d1struction of Sodam and Gomor.-
rah bleAu.e 2t the §1nfYka!ID s! ~hefte two ~~th!" Other ex-
am:ples could be cited trom the Old Testament of plagues, wars, 
famine, and disease which were sent to punish a nation or an in-
dividual tor sin. But because these pertain to revelation they 
cannot be accounted as philosophioal evidenee here, 
To 8ay that God w111 not punish rebellion against Him--
.1n, in other words--is to falsity the idea ot God. God is not 
onlyaoo4J He is also just. In faot, 1f God did not punish evil 
would He not aotually be encouraging sin? Men,being what they 
are, would take advantage ot this one-sided goodness of God and 
behave when it was oonvenient for them to bel'..ave. Thus, the 
just man would be the one to sutter, for both he and the unjust 
man would be treated alike by God. We can see,then, that not 
only would God be encouraging Sin, but the whole.order of justic 
wo~ld be unbalanced. Such a notion contradicts the very idea ot 
God, it also contradicts seriJ)ture,.'O 
'0 Although God des1res.the salvation of all, Bcriptur 
has many instances of His punishing unrepentant sinners. In Th 
~o}f.Q.! !1gdo~ (3, 10), we reade. "The wicked shall be punished 
. .acco;idIrig tohelr sins." In St. Matthew: "These shall go into 'eve~iastin, punishment" (Matt., 25, 46). 
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• There is a two-told aspect ot punishment. One looks 
to the offender, the other looks to society. Criminology may 
iavor the reformantion of the criminal, but that does not hinder 
us from olosing the prison doors on thousands of criminals every 
year. Such a punishment ser'tes to achieve two endsl (1) to re-
form the individual offenders, and (2) to serve as a warning to 
other members ot society whomight be tempted to commit orime. 
Some punishment does not attain both these ends entirely. The 
electric chair may not reform a murderer, but it does serve to 
reform society as a whole, and it restores balance to the order 
of justice. Without punishment, justice would soon become a 
mockery. 
It is, then, precisely because God favors the repen-
tence of sinners that He sometimes sends them natural evils as 
punishments for their sins. Wltness the terrible social disease 
that often rollow the misuse 'Of sex. Is it hard to see in them 
a punishment for sin as well as a str'Ong induoement to Ilve 11 
good moral live? No, the theory that non-moral evils are some-
times a punishment for moral evils 1s a sound one. The w'Ord 
10fP..'Uilt!!, however, is an important part 'Of the explanation of 
purtlsbment. This explanation 'Of evll can be and ls, from time 
to time, misapplled. But these misapplications do not hinder 
·1 t item remaining an integral part of the complete explanation 
ot fhe problem of evil. 
r 
• the third solutlon to the problem of evil 1, that non-
moral evil ••• y be regarded a. disciplinary. Protes.or Bright. 
man cautiously admits there is .ome truth to thIs explanation, 
but he conclude. that -the whole theory ot evil as dlaeipl1nal'Y 
ralls tar short of belng phl1oso~hioal1y adequate.",l In his: 
oonsideration of this third solution, BrIghtman uncovers an ob-
jection and otter. a solution to it. Both are worth noting, 
W. find that sometime. evil fact. are explained as actually 
le.din, to nobler and more spil'ltual living, also that 
Barlettme,--and pel"M'P8 more frequently-evil facts lead 
to mO.1'e and more resentful, debased, depre,.ed, and hopeles 
11"11ng .... Detend.rs or this disciplinary viewf however, re .... 
tort that th.,. facts do not show a lack ot diSCiplinary 
intent on God •• part, 01" even &. le-ok of wisdom, justice, 
or power. but indicate the presente ot a misuse of'~tre.dom 
by man in the taee of disciplinary opportun1t1es.'4 
J..tter making this analys:!s, Brightman proceeds to prob 
d •• pe1' into the heart of disciplinary ev11. Because he presup-
poses that diSCipline ia the purpose of all .. il, the author 
set. up two conditions that disciplinary evil should meet. Fir.· 
and foremost, these evils should appear wherever they are needed. 
&n:d only when they are needed. Secondly, they should be perfect 
1y 64apted to their end. W. realise the first cond! tion is un-
ne •••• ary _hen .e freely admit that discipline 1s not the ~rpQ. 
ot ail evil, that it 1s not the total answer to the nroblem. !h 
j,' 
'1 Brightman, ! Pb!lolSRbI !itt. B!:L!s:19B. 262. 
,2 Ib~., 262, 263. 
.. 
freedom and d1scipline. But neither freedom nor disoipline 
nor the two taken together approaoh a complete or ooherent 
account of aotual evil.35 
Freedom and d1sotp11ne and punishment are all parts of 
the total solution to the problem of evil. Another important 
part of the entire answer is the fact that God frequently uses 
physical evil to achieve a higher spiritual good. All these 
pa rts taken together still do not give a complete solution. To 
know that, 1';e would have to comprehend the purposes of God. This 
last 1s the all-important lin..\( we must not torget. The parts of 
the solution here offered do give a coherent and reasonable ao-
oount of evil. They seem to go as far as human limitations can, 
to solve a problem which is both human and divine. 
If the existenoe ot natural evils does not contradict 
the omnipotence of God, and since moral evil can be classified 
as an abuse by men ot their freedom, there seems to be no just 
reason to argue against the infinite nature of God from the 
e. pr~ence of evils in the l/orld. The G3.vep of Brightman should, 
neve~htele$s,merit some consideration, since it constitutes a 
striking and impr:l:rtant feature of our author's own explanation 
ot, evil. ~ G1.'!h then, will be oonsidered in the concluding 
,;- ; 
chapter. 
J.' 
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CHAPTER V 
THE OIVENt CONCLUSION 
The concept of e. "Given" did not originate with Edgar 
S. Brightman. Although he did not use the same name, John Stuar 
Mill wrote about the same idea in his work, Xln:ee Essays 9l! Ii!U. 
gion, published in lS74. Analyzing experience, Mill finds tl~t 
there are preserving agencies and destroying agencies present in 
the world. l These latter, he says, we might be tempted to 8S-
eribe to the will of a different Creator. But Mill passes over 
this temptation to dualist'l, stating that it cannot be supposed 
-that the preserving agencies are wielded by one Being, the (1, .... 
stro11nC ageneies by another. ft His reason 1s that 8the destroy-
ing ag~eie:s are a necessary part of the preserving agencies." 
Mill attributes the imperfeetions in the universe either ftto the 
shortcomings in the worlananship as regards its intended purpose, 
or to external foreesnot under the control of the workman. ft 
Millts "Given" would seem to be only external matter 
ex~1'lnsle to God. Mill describes his ftGiven" in these words. 
~. ' 
1 Mill, Three ESia!! on Religion, 185. 
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We may conclude, then, that there is no ground in Natural 
Theology for attr1buting 1ntelligence or personality to 
the obstacles which partially thwart VThat seems the pur-
poses ot the Creator. The limitation or his power more 
probably results either tram the qualities ot the material 
-.the substances and forces ot which the universe 1s eom-
posed not admitting ot any arrangements by which his pur-
poses could be more completely fulfilled, or else, the pur-
po •• a might halte been more tally attained, but the Creato!' 
did not know how to do it; creat1ve skill, wonderful as it 
is# was not sufficiently perfect to accomplish his purpose, 
more thoroughly.2 
'rote. SOl" Brilht.an goes into some deta.il to explain 
hts theo" ot these .obstacles which partially thwa.rt wh&t seem 
the pur,oses ot the Createrr. 'It To these obstacles heglves the 
nam. ot Ib! PiYIa- His proof' tor the existence ot lhl g&VIQ 
118. in the tact that there 1s evil in the world which cannot 
be imputed to san.' -the difficulties undeiwh1ch the divine wi1 
evident.ly labors in expressin, the perfection desired 1n the 
world •• lso &11'e evidence to the beliet -that there 1s an .ter-
nal Given .,leaent in divine experience. whioh is not the produet 
ot divine wl11.-4 An example otth •• e dlttleult!es 1 ••• en in 
the slow and paintul process.. ot lite, and 1'n the presence of 
earthquake., cyclones, and disease germs in the world. 
> 
I 
It 1s in 1U. P:ul?J.s 9.t. GQ~ that Brightman introduce' 
, 
III , 11 4 , b I 
2 lll.14. # 186 • 
. 1.: ): Brightman. l.hi PIP!! •• .slt. .Q9!., 126 • 
.4 .na&. j 127. 
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• hi. theory ot %ba 9txII- Hi. definition of lhl ~ItD 1s really 
the latter half' of h!s definition of God. 
There 1s within him God in addition to hts reason and 
hi' oreat! •• will. a passive element ~h1ch enters into 
everyone ot his conscious states, as sensation, instinot, 
and impulse enter into ours, and constitutes a problem 1'01' 
h~. This element we eall The Given. The ev11s of life 
and the delays in the atta1nftent of value, in $0 tar as 
they come trom God and not from human freedom; are thus 
due to his nature, yet not wholly to his deliberate choice. 
Ris will and reason acting on The G1vErn produce the world 
and aeh.leve value in 1 t. S 
We seetrom this deS0ri'Ptive definition that Brightman dlff'~r& 
trom lUll on this theory, and ls, at thes&me tae, more detinitti 
than )lUI. Brightman's theory is thBt the obstael$s to God's 
purpose, the lbt1tat1on of God's power, is something internal 
to God. It 1s &l ~nts$ntial ark of the dlvine na.ture. l:a!. GiV',.l 
1. th. $ource of an eternal problem to God. It ls irrational. 
In itself" it 'cannot be Wlderstood, yet an under,tanding u.s. 
uy be made of tt, and through the conquest and shaping of' it 
aea..'ling may be achieved.·6 
OUr author gives five aspeets of' lh! Q1!~ whioh need 
to be eonsidered 1n order to understand the theory. l.b!. GiXfm 
is $:M1g1g11s, tor -it 1s conseious ex~eriance of God ••• There 1s 
f,· ,; 
no.' uQ.scious matter in <led." It 1s SSiUJPdtlil11t1 t stands for the 
, iii: u , 
1,: , ll?!t!1. , 113. 
6 tbJrd .• , 18,. 
'\ 
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entire unereate4 and eternal nature or God ••• Thls Given enters 
.s a partially distorting and delB:~t1ng factor into every eret.tive 
act of God. Tia., alao, 1s an aspect ot the complex Given.-
It is It.mll; otherwise, it would have to be a d1--;1ne creation. 
It is impossible to cone.love of God's creating ~h6 present sort 
or world unless there is·something in God which renders such 
at creation the O$st POi3ible,; that someth.tng ... is the et{~!'n~l 
Given ... " It is lnt~U"UlJ. tg ,gggJ it limits him. ·withln as truly 
as "WithQut ••• an uncreatad eternal limitation, within the divine 
nature.· It is .".ml~l"ol~ed qI Oed: -It explains the presence ot 
the horrIble evils and dlstortlons ••• But allot these factors 
are patiently tEiCed by the divine goodness $nO our of them aj.l 
God brings meaning •• '1 This view, Brightman remarks, 1$ an Ropen_ 
eyed and honest- view of thQ goodness ot God" It l"eeognl.e. 
7 Brightman • .nw. Zln.4m& !!l!..i9.sl, 174-177. Our author 
gIves his five $,spects of :the' Given, in this section. One rather 
amusing aspect of The Gtven reflects, it sElultmi.l, Brighton's 
I~hodlst baclqround.. .thi SUS]'jlg is .upt a teetotaler; JfTh(3 
thought of The GIven has an inspiring aspect. The hinderances 
to value with which lite abounds are not simply to be accepted 
as the'will ot God. 1hey are rather that against wh1eh God is 
battling" and he invites us to join the battle ••• OUr faith may 
reply that God has no deSire that there shall be amy alcohol; 
its presence thus tar 1s the outcome of Godtl struggle "11th The 
GIVeth, ~f we join with God in the struggle, it may be that al-
cohol tItll alway. exist but at least its evil eonatequenoes oan 
be overcome, 1t men w11i conquer the appetite tor drink, refuse 
to use alcohol as $ bever_sa and join with God in driving it out 
or its present plaC'e of uttery over human wills and bodfss and 
h.app1n$s~.. (~., 181) 
... 
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the evils ot lit. and doel not try to sugar-coat them. wan the 
other hand 1t does not ascribe them to God's w1ll and thus make 
him ~GrallY so remote trom all that we know of goodness as to 
be almost a monster. e' 
In sp1te of Brlshtman t s lengthy descript1on, it 1s not 
altogether 01 •• 1" 3ust what the exact nature ot l'.b& g1v!n is. It 
wst be either a being or a non-bein,. It" it is a non-being, 
certainly it cannot b.~~ source of problem and task to God. w9 
It it 1s a being, it must be either ereated or unereated. Pro-
f.ssor :Brightman hold. that we eould never knoVJ why God would 
create .ueh a thing.lO The Given, he conclude., is wan uncreat-
ad limitatIon.ell fo avoid the diff1culties of dualism, which 
appear to be insoluble, our author makes lh! gilt; a limitation 
within the nature of God. thIs limitation, how.vEll', is the _tel' 
nal source ot the evil against which God is struggl1nth God, 
then, must be thought ot as struggling alalnst the evil ot which 
His eternal nature is the souroe. God, in other words, is 
struggling with himselt. St1ll .. Brightman's concept ot God 1. 
that ot •• Person or supremely good wl11. tt12 And he claims 
f , 
. , 
1~ ¥ 
8 Xblg.., 178. 
9 Brightman, Ibl Eta» •• ; ~ God, 183. 
10 Ib1s1 • 
11 Brl,htman,!tIlt. l!nd1I!1 9l. A9.!!, 177. 
2. .:tb j d., il'~. 
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that:hl. gillD 'st;;anda tor the entire unere.ted and ete:rnal-nature. 
of God. w13 There.\ ,appears to be a· eon tradiQtion in having God 
- .. Person of lSu}lre!emely good w1111 and an "entire uncl'eated and 
eternal nature' th!~.t is passive and a problem. tor God. BoW' can 
Codls natu.re be a : problem to Hlmself. how can it be passive, it 
1 t 1s supposed tha-A.t God is uncrea ted and eternal' It God's na-
ture 1s composite.. and trom what we have already seen of Bright. 
man theory, it can .. hardly be concluded ethen-ise, then He cannot 
be uncreated and e-·ternal. Composition as such is an inrperfectl0 
and could only hav.-. as it' ultimate source a perfect Being who 
ta alto simple. r."O make God composite. then, is to make Him 
oreated. Also, in ~ trying to avoid the difficulties of dualilm, 
Bright.an has made lWt 2&'9'G itlternal to God. But 'What other 
(Jondulion 1s to b.~. drawn than that this theory ot Dl Q!II.D 
makea God the supr ••• e principle Gf both ,ood and ev11] Dualism 
1s not .'9"01484. Iit 1. simply drawn into the very Godhtt.4, tOJ! 
God 1. a .Person o~ supremely lood will,' and at the lame time 
~g~jD# wbich W~ must re ... ber is an essential part ot God" 
nature, is tht9 sOUn"ce of all ev11, excepting that caused by hu-
Ilan t"..doa. 
~: , 
Thus the theory ot The Given does not solve the prob-
1 •• or ev11, nor dc:x')e. it .bsGlve God from the ltatural ev11s ot 
·earthitUake., cyclo~es, and di8ease.. The theory ot lba gll!U 
tend~ to pre,.". tbaft which its inventor wanted it to disprove. 
1.3. Ibid., 175 
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In short, it i8 self-contradictory, for it make. God both suprem 
11' good and at the same ttae the source ot ev11. 
It has been shown that the whole theory ot .lbl G~!m 
was proposed by Brightman as a solution to the problem ot evil. 
e.pecially the problem. ot surd eVil. But sinee he has failed 
to prove that surd evil exists, since all other evils ean be 
rattonally explained without calling on .1l'a gj.Y!lh and since the 
very theol!')" ot lba GtYIll contains a note of selt-contradiction, 
it seems only reasonable to reJect Brightman t • explanation. 
In Chapter X ot his \fork, A ~h'lQ!9Phl .Q[ l!l~&ipD' 
Bright •• lists tive main obJections to the position ot an in-
tinite God. ·'a a $~ry and conclusion of this thesis, a brier 
refutation ot these objections of our author will be attempte<1. 
By this refutation, it is hoped that the stability ot theistic 
absolutism will be shown) and .. at the lame time, the .eakn.e •••• 
ot theist:tc tinitis.,Moovere4. Brightman summaria.s his ob-
3ections thus, 
'!'here are five objections to theistic absolutism which, 
taken together, render it a highlX improbable view. These 
are (1) its appeal to ignorance, (2) its ascription ot 
surd • .,11s todlvtne will, C,) itl tendency to make good 
~,and ev11 indistinguishable, (4) it. cutting the ne"e ot 
. moral endeavor, and (S) it. unempiriea1 character. Let 
us consider these in o1"4e1".14 
,., ¢ r J I ) 4$ 
r 
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(1) 1U IRPM6 sa .. arM.. *:he ""l\1Mnt tor the-
1.tle ab.olutl •• ,· BP11ht.an claima, "entai18 the adais8lon that 
we O&lIDOt explain the surd eVU8--tbe wa.te, the crueltJ', tbe 
1D~u.tl. or .t .. --&.4 ,bat we 1IUat adJd.t OUl' 1pOraDoe. tf To 
a"old u.dle.~ "pet1t10n, we wUl liIl1t OUNely.s to the clar,. 
t:tat the ,o.l'loa ot aa 1Df1D1te God. .ppeals to l_eNn- to 
, , 
"Plaia t ... l1a ot the wOI'14. We Will 'Nat ot s.devU when 
..... ~ w1~ ... eeond o'bt!eotlOll. lathe tOJeI01Dc cMpter. 
we baye a1NacJr PN .. Dt.4 •• vera1 reasOD&l_ uplanatlOll8 tor 
tll. pre,e.ce ot art1 111 the wor14. lIoN.l ."Ula .xpla1ae4 'b7 
tM tI'M'OII or an t. ws,.1l. la-.oral .... 11 oa:tl be explalned a • 
.. ~s.u-a' tor .111, .. disclpllDa1'1 "CtlO11, .. IleaDI of en.Ct-
1ac .. ~"r .p1r1tal 1004, .. '.stine crollDcl and .1 tor us to 
_r1t., peater~. We .. 4II1t that 1ft 1I141v14-.1 .s •• one 
or all of '''.e uplaatiOll' ., Dot be tM GU~it solution, 
tor we .. IMtftI' coapreb.eJl4 the dlva. PVPO'.' in perllitt1n, 
natural evU. Thu is not, .traDle. We an lla1t.ct oreatures 
and oarmot upen to exhaut the lmow.b1l1\7 ot tbe Creator. 
BriP"" h1rIIelt a4ld.t. onll .. part1&l upl .. tla 1. pOssible: 
U Get 18 Ute 0.1,0"'" be1q he 18 trad1tlouU, be11e .. 4 
to bet 1\ 1 ••• 17 .'ftJl&8 tbat he ha. cho.eR the 110w and 
,OO"lr ..... ot ••• lut1_ tertlle .... tlon. of Ute. It he 
'18 11ll1t.4 .., the ."1'Ml en.tence of uner_ted liven ex-
pu1ea .. With1ft h1a _t'are. tM .tra .. x. •• 11 pa»t1allY 
•• plaiDed aDd 1Dt.l'preted. but it 18 still ..,'.1'10 •. 1.5 
. J: 
, 
• 
(2) DJ. IIB.PSlr2B 9l. .Il1r4 Ua.. 12 <St!'J.Dt w~~" Tb1 • 
.. 00114 o'b~.ltlon 11 not' exactl,. aoeurate. nrl', Prot.s.or 
Bright .. saU ~t tbel1t1c ab801uti.a "oarmot axp1&111 the luret 
•• Uti" SlOW he .448 tat "An uphola..:t- ot that Y1." Bst tind t 
. , . . , ' . 
ult1ate IO'eOe or aU .v4 evUa in the wl11 ot Ood." It-7 
be 1&14 1Jl '*-plJ ,_, it ·absolutua -.rulet expla1rl sV4 evil, it 
18 8s..ply ___ 8 there 18 no 8uGb th1.ns. bd 1t tMN 1s no 
.' . 
• \tell '1:d.Dc. we .. !w.Hl7 a.elbe 1t to the 41Y1ne nU. Br1sht-
an ._ ,.., to otter &UI1 luba1:lant1al proot tor the exilt.nee 
ot 8" artl. So tar his -1Js upaeat tor 1t .eeu to beth • 
• utt • .ri.q in u1.1s aBc! tille ...... t.· 1B evolution. Both ot 
,.,. baYe .en uplauMni 1ft the torego1llc obapter, where 1t ... 
"~4o\t't ,"*t tbe po.alble .1IIttel'1nI 1n an1-.l1 il ."'81-
"'a" b.r \he very .. 'UN ot ... t1ent belDc. aad ,bat the plea-
...... tar oawelp the 8'Utter1n1 1rl u.S.l 11te" 1' ... alao 
al1011il 'M' ........ , ... in ",olution 1. aor. an .... plAt at the 
lana.e., and. pro41pl1tr of d1V1M po_,.. 
Ct,1ft, thlthel'laq4" book. %bI on.,. IDA Slal$b '" lJ'». 
lUI. lIaMad,l' Irish'an -7' "tbat the a_bel' of t1sh t-., 
..... ~'1DC ot."lertlah 1n • liven ~\1t •. 1. aboll' eq_1 'p the 
,:. .. 
,1 J . 
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ber of drops ot water going over :Ni.gara, Falls 1.n that lllimlte." 
Our author &,ppears to eonelder this taot "collo.mal waste in the 
lire processes. tt .A eOJlPlete anSWer to this d1f't1aulty woul.d re ... 
quiro reterenee to variety and order in the universe, to the goo 
of a,ctiT1tYt and to the enlightening ot tUU'l. Here 'We will only 
ask it there 1s anythinl so intrinsically wrong about havL~, a 
lower tish used to sustain .. hi,gher type of fish.. This t>~oc .... 
••• s more a tremendo11s argument tor the divine Providence ot 
God. Witb all those billions of fish eating billion. of fish 
every minute, our lake., str6ams, ~nd oceans still remain stocke 
with plentiful fish of all varieties. We can, only begin to im-
agine the terrible evil that would result from the ov .. r .. sur'pl:u.s 
of fish it they 41d not 6at one another. 
Let us tak$ tbat sue example ot the fish to .ho .... the 
inconsistency otBrlgbtman's position on %hi. giYln as an explana 
tion ot surd evil. Our author would consider the waste ot fish 
a surd evil whioh 1& necessitated by Jb! g1x!Q. God would l1ke 
to do sOllethin.i to sti,ve all those fish, but lIe does not hflve the 
powu. Yet Brightman a180 tells us plainly that l'.bi g;tUD 
-studs fer the entire Mereated and eternal nature or God.._18 
ThU,' Vi;e can Justly ar,u., (1) IWi gi!ID is theoause or SUN 
4;HI < 
. , 17 J:rilhtun, A. Pb.1J.tSUI9l2bl Ji.l. ll'lJ&~oQ, 315, '16 • 
16 Bl-l,htm.an, lb!. r~~1 Rt.§sA" 175. 
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evil. (8) hti nt. ga.xM .tana tor the ent1re _tUN of God. 
(3) !beNton, the entue _tllN ot God 1. th. e&lI.. ot tM. 
8 ... 11. ~ .hOW GaD God ,. .11pre-17 pod and tbe _._ ot eT11' 
BrlPt_n •• ,8 that 'M1ltlo a_olutl •• 1. wrolll .cause 1:t a.-
erll1aa lurd enl '0 the 41 ... ue wUl. Altho. Br1lhtart bas Dot 
,""4 'hf 8xllt._ ot 1V4 .... 11, hi. 01Ift positlon would 101-
loal.l.T lead t. aeelbal 8 ... 11 to ~ 41Y1ae _tUM .. 
(S) Dl StUtaIl .u. .... 94 _ m~ i.PAI1iWaytJr 
,.... !bi' d1tt1Ctllt, _.rce. trOll Br1&ht .. ' s idea that "a\)So-
l.e \Mlall en_ll. the propo.1:tloa tbat all apparent enl 1. 
"&117 1004 •• 19 Br18htaa wo1l14 ar_ tbat tr_ the a.o1\1t1lt I 
rt... 'both 1004 aDd evU are ... 4 '" \he diy1De wUl Qd are 
iMnta 1004. Belle .. ,.1 18 ... Walte 604, hoWn'er. __ a 
o1Mr 41.tunloD between 1004 .,.4 .. U. III ,be ••• of Il0l'&1 
cood aad •• U. \he dlst1not1cm 11 ... err ~iD1.. It 1e .. ~, 
n11 to II1U.'4er loaeoM. wbether that ... 0De 1. Ul _borll W-" 
u __ 4 •• oer ,.. tleat. or ,be teller s.a .. nellhborhoOd "bank. 
lot ,1. _~ .. 11 to pnetloe art1tlolal b1rth coDtrol, both 
tor r1 .... 4 poor. la .aaeral. wbattrt'er aot1_ lAdl WI '0 01U' 
\ll,l. __ eAd, 004. 1. aoNllI' lOOd; wba ..... r aot1oa _tel'8 \18 
tNa ',., 8.4 18 .. r-111 .... 11. Ye' l' caD be arltM4 'tbat God 
IIrMll ItOJI&l .Vila q4, 'Mp.tore. 1.D. 8«*8 .eUe wUl. thell. 
): 
" • Wba' God d1..NctlJ nU., ltoweTer, 18 tbat all should reeel .. e Ul4 
exerol •• bis Ood ... aiveD ,1ft or tree.w1ll. God will. &114 00-
operated 1D all aat!. .... COIlSi4eN4 1n '!leU _teml &.pen. 
thea toral ,oodUa. or WiOlte4ne.8, thoush, depeau _ ... 
Brllb'" was,' .ore l1ke17 ,.ten1na to _tural ... 118 
wbeza he .a14 ..... t coulaer tbe. as ,004. W1tbowt ,_Uti_. 
tl_ IUs ...... 11 110t tlW. The be11 ... 1- 111 U1 1Dt1n1te God 
_"al8q hol48 that. ra,1DI tlood 18 .... t ... l 41sa8ter. JJe 
Hcopl ... CUloer .... ,.a1_1 .... 11 .... t work to oo_.t. 
It hi ••• pta po110, he sri .... 3uI' .e tbe the18t10 t1l11t11' 
wou14. au works Jut a. harc1 to bay. h1II oure4. Be reaU ... 
\hat t •• e th1qs are ev118 on the natural plau. !beN 1. a 
, •• "108 ot d1tterent plaae.. hO'tfeYel'. .., 18 ..n.l (only Hla-
tl"'.17) _ lta OWB plaM caa 'be • 8004 1a relatloa to .. h1&Mr 
one, It 18 .o .... t the ea. a. the ........ re • th1q 1n act 
_ oae plute oan 'be 111 pot_.,. with "pH to au,ur. the ab-
.01ut1., QOw, \bat pbJ"s1.1 1lla can .. UNci to beDetit .. 111 
• spu1t_1 .7. Yet be 40e. not .... t17UC to cong_. thea, 
.iD .. tb.eJ are f aa'u.rallT .pea.k1nI, evU. In shon, he 18 f\tllT 
COJlY1a .. 4 ot the tnth ot S'. Paul' 8 word.. -Por tM" who lO'h 
.,' 
Oe4. 'all ~p worle: '..-'bar _to load" (RO.aD8. VIII. 28) • 
.. he .tUl help. buU4 .. tlood _11, •• hill oh114ND "OC1-
-utel, Met 11 •• , hls dollar to the cancel' tund. 
• To aub-
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'roD! a tbeoretioal standpoint, tbeistic ab.olutism, 11ke 
other types or ablolutl.s, rezove. all incentlv. top moral 
r~ora of the tndlvldual or ot 8oolety ••• Ab.olutl~ holds 
tom opt1.! •• which ap11 •• that tbe world 1. alreecl.:y time 
ltlsly perteet. It 1. t 18 p.ertee\, why try to iapl'OVCt 1 t' It 
.v.~ ev11 1. really a lood, why try to eliminate .. 11.,20 
On the contRry, theistic _banlut!. 40es not claim that thIs 
pJI ••• tworld. 1. altolethe-r perteet, it 1. pert.etl,. w1Iline to 
admlt 1all)Ufeotlonl 1ft the un!".,,!.,. It he.ly admits that Go4, 
ob3ecU".ly ,paald"l, could MY'" made at _ell mor ... perfect world. 
lor clo •• absolutism deny thl. t pbysioal tvl1a are really ev1ls 
and try to sugar.coat them •• ,ood. A hvrlcane i. a hl,hten. 
for... It can caus. 4"a4tul physical ruin 1n a town, .Ia1, 1n. 
nori4a. A. ,\loh 1t 1. a pb111041 evll. Rowe ... er, that •••• bur 
r1.&D. lit,. make the olt1MS'lIJ ot that town rea1tlethat eternal 
values COIle ftrat. A8 .uch, It 1s an 1n.trw.lent tor 1004. 
Ab.olut1e, tar trom remoying all 1nc.nt1 •• tor llIJoral 
r.to~J ?ecoID1... tht. present world as a tr1al and test1n, 
,rot.md. It .pun DMm OIl, linee thelr wbole eternity bang. 1n 
the bale;nce, to t1ght the lood tllht 1ft this lit., to strive and. 
to:
r 
_ .. qatr, tbat tbeir etemal ~ftaN uy b. exc.edinaly ,reat. 
I~ otherworda, because the1stlc abeolutl •• take. into account 
,the .~lt ot m.'. exlste08, both b&f'ore and atter death 04 
.. 
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• doe. not narrow its view to this present lite, it imparts true 
meanine and purpose and enthusiasm to our moral endeavors. Here 
alain, Brightmants position seems to be baled on a talse optimi. 
He would insist that God has done as perfect a job on the world 
a. a limited God ean do. :low we on 01.\1" part should help such a 
God .ake the pr •• ent world as perfect as we can. Bo doubt, such 
.. vi_ has 1 ts eo.endable points, but there 1s the danger of 
mistak1n& m.~1 tor the end of our existence. There is dan,er 
ot putt1n, an undue empM,1. on the present lite and forg.ttinl 
1ts esaential character of a test1n. Iround tor a better life 
to e... The end ot our existence 1s not to lead a a.ti, com-
tortable lite without carea or .arrows. It 1s, rather, to b .... 
com. a. l1ke to God al possible, and treq:uently the best mean' 
ot aooompllshlng this 1s th. hard road ot overoom1n, difficult!. 
trials, and .elf-love. 
(5) na YDIIIPil3,llJ. charAS;!;IZ_ Brightman expla1ns th 
import of this ob2ection when he .tate.. liThe root ot all the 
objeotions to theistic &bsoluti~ 1s that it is a theory found •• 
in A Dllsli faith, whioh 1n turn irows out of desi~ •• found in 
cel'ta1n type. of religious experience. lta1 hliet in an infinite 
a~~ i. founded on taith and do •• not take into aecount all the 
tact. of experience. It 1s unseientific. Is this actually true 
): 
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Let us take .s an en.mple the 911"'9. 1&11 of St. !ho-
ma. to see whether tbe po.t tlon ot en intlnt t. God 1. l"8$11y .a 
u!u.plrloal as some claim. take tb$ third ,"of for in.. 8xls-
tence ot God, the .J"JU1lent tl"O. cont1nlency. the tect of eon-
t1nlency 1s at the eol".' ot every being that ul.ts, .!!'lid. trom 
God la.eU. thts proof look. at "'.l"'f creature that has exlst. 
or 1. e:d..tine or can uilt, ."ery flowe,., even sur, every 
man, evena.bn, trom. AnalYllnl the •• empincal cont1nc-t b~ 
1ngs 1t 1"1'8. to the one nece.sary beinl, God. !he sas. 1. true \ 
of the ."C'U.lleftU trom- cause and cot1on. !he •• aqua,ents look at 
the -.pIneal tact. at oause aa4 IaOtion thet entel" into OUt" ttY. ... 
etay lty... rroa.. CODlide,..tlO1l of the •• ooncret., Individual 
tact. *. artfWlCiGt a4.sllc.. to tbe natu.e ot .au.. and motion, 
troa tbtl analyal. of the nature or the two it conclud •• t'M:t 
theH aUI' be a "r.t·Vno_u.s. Cau.e, I. Prime IIOV81'. Certalnl,. 
such rlasonlng cannot be branded unempirloal. In the fourth 
and fiftb arJU8eQta, echola,tle ~h11o.oph.rl. looktnc at the 
11'ad$. of b .... llty and the peJ'feotlon 11'1 beinl' about th., and 
ren.etinlon the order in .on-intellectual beinl' aad 11'1 the 
urt1 ..... as a :wbole, anive at God '[}reel.ely because they fin.d 
in ;Jl~ the tN. Dlealfti ot the _plr1cal facts that aunou_d 
th_. the que.tion could be tntt. Do •• Briabtman take AU. the 
tact~: lnto coftaldettatlon. Doe.- he ••• baTond the .urrae ••• an-
inc of everyday oantina.nt b$lnl to so •• thinl .te~,l' Bather. 
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doe. not he seeem to be the one who 1s tailing here to live up 
to the standard he has set tor himself, na.mely, to oonsider all 
the tacts' 
In philosophical considerations there 1s the necessity 
01' making sure that one has the true facts and as many of them 
as it is possible to attain. But above and beyond this, we must 
searoh out the meaning 01' these tacts·. It 1. ne' •• sary to eon-
sider them trom every angle, to let beneath their sutface mean-
ing and Irasp their true significance. Brightman himselt makes 
this same ple. in lhI Prrd21g .9.t. i9,slt 
So with GodJ you may constantly be dealing with tacts that 
0 ••• trom. h1It. yet entlrely miss finding him. W. )JUst get 
away from the pedantic worship ot mer.e. tacts, heret I su.-
p •• ', the protessor and the businessman otten coma t the 
.... errol'. They otten C1!1', 'Lett, let down to the taets'-
Yee, by aU means, but unl •• s W. oan ,ind out what the taotll 
•• an, what they point to, what they are worth, all the taotl 
in the world 1'1111 be usel..,s to us.22 
It would •••• that Prote •• or Brightman h.s unwittingly 
fallen into the snare about which he is warning other.. He hal 
oo~.idered the empirical facts, but has failed to see their ulti· 
mate .1Inifleance. He has1nvestigated the evils in the world, 
but. not entirely, not from an eternal viewpoint. He has become 
; 
lo.tin the problem of good.and-evil. The only solution he has 
seen to this problem is the one offered by f'initism.. The prin-
cipal dlfticultyot Brightman, it appears, is a metaphysical one 
lOB 
.. 
Be ..... to tall to 1' ... 11 •• tbat tM _1D que.tl_ 1n ph1loa.pbJ' 
1. the ,ue.tlO1l of beiq. :s. las· eo_ 1ft ooata.et with tho'WlaD.d. 
ot ooatlllp.t lMt1q8. .... la, ...... pen.trated to the true 811-
1'11fl... or their ooat1raCeaer. 'thi8 the tbe rea._ be ...... 
tha •• t_.at: -It 1. vue \hat tbere 18 DO real taft whlob . 
taka 'bJ It.lAt, 18 coaolu1 .... endeD. tbat God. 18 real.-a 
Dl1 1. true .. it JSr1&h"~ _u .klD et1.4 .... 'but fro •. the 
oo"'~ .. wen .. a trOll 0-.1' _0111'"' 1ft. bU. wrlt1Dl'. he 18 
" , ' 
.peald.q or Ul7 .'f1.4eaoe, 41ftot OJ' 1rJ41reet.. TUs .. 18 wbr. h1. 
OOIlclU1oal are 80 _eenala. _ he 1. t01'.« to a4a1t tt<tbat 
t1aal 1ftt.U.nual ... t.U.at7' 18 lapoaslbl •• •84 It 18 wbJ he 
._'. at tbe ead. ot h18 •• uch, _ke tile follow2.q &41118.1011: 
heJ:l1l the ovto .. ot OV .. arch tor God. .1' -1 '- ,bat 
we ..... S .. 41111,. aa4 ftOuclr. 1l\tt we bav. sear_a and 
.... 40 .no .oM tMn '-11 wta, we haft toa4. 1II'.tnhIr or 
JlOt .. , ... ... tcnm4 .. eau., 1a aeiteP n..,.r to the 41-
nae 'Mia cm17 004 hSJaIeltDOWI. 
In 'IUs tMlls I then, .---tbins ot tbe ... ~ of 
Prot ••• or .. 1P' ... ·s po.ltlOl'l haa be.n .... lilT .. 'brSMt coulder-
et10a ot til. theoriA. ot .... 11111, and I .. a. fte proot, Pro-
f ••• or lr1cl\taD ott • .,.. tor tbe uln._or 004 are 8\'1oh that 
'll., ... oalT lea4 to • t1n1t. God. fbe att:plbQ •• M _1ftta,ln. 
sa ' .... 144 • 
. I: M Br1&htaan. nt. l'I*&nl It bAt 't. 
II INA •• 1 •• 
• 
U#,." 1a 004 _" shOWJl to pre.uppo •• an4 refleo" the 4ootl'U. 
of theiRl' t1lt1tl... !tie probl_ of ,004~-"11 bal bee 
".a~,-.n's ar--" Ha.Oll tor hol • .u-c tat G04 1. t1a1te .• 
Bat l' ba ...... lbo1ta ,"*t • tala. 0,,114 .. \1I'14 •• U •• h1. th1Dlt-
1DC .. thi •• ,..... Bltt_, .... ·• taU .. to »NY. the .nlta.,. 
ot au4 n1J. ..... alao aot.4. On the otM~ "4, ..... .,.'ble 
.Q1a_t1~ •• OM or thee boa PHte •• or 1Ps.p, ... h1_lt i 
law .......... 4 t. llltel"P"' the exlst__ ot ... 11 ill the 
.... 14; IIoal en1 1. 4.· '0 '*e treecl_ of .. fl rill. G04 11 
d1Mo\1J tha .... of all _tlt1 .. beiDI _ tiOt ot aU pnva-
t1oal,. alB ...... "'81 .. 1 .. 11 1. a pr1Yatlon. GOd oemlot be 
be14 "'""'lI' .... s,...lble.. God eaa Ul4 does .e "leal .. U. 
18 ..... ., U to eorrblb1tt. t. tbe hi'-r po4ot·u ·1Il41v14 
-.1 w poup .t 1D41v14\1al1l. III the ani.l wor14~ ... haye .a. 
t .. , the __ ,004 18 \0 be coa.1de .. 4 'bef'o,.. the 1004 of the 
s.acu.v14'Ual.1_1., F1nallf. Brllhtaan" thM17 .ot .Da OitUD ha 
... conll"", ... ~"'ote. al 'UIlteaable. au_it 1apl1e. a 
-.'1'&41ot1_. 
ta .hoJt', bote.eor DriPt-- baa laUe4 '0 prow the 
., 
, 
_,. •• 1" .. 0£ f1lt1\ ..... in God. lor baa --114l1 __ bUs.d 
pe.". Qe4 as' be ~1rt1t. 1Il oretel' to ••• a suttle1 •• ' rea-
.. 80J.lJtor .,... .... ex1stea ... or tbat of the 1'IOrlct Sonwb.1eh we U,... 
All e18. o •• s... of 0.4 1 •. OOJlt1Dpllt. •• t1n1te bei.q 01' 1at1.Jlt\ 
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series ot tinite contingent beings can validly explain the exis-
tence ot other contingent bein,s. The reason is simply that the 
must look to another being tor their own existence. From the 
tact ot existing contingent being. the existence ot a Necessary 
Beinl, the One dependent on nothing else tor existence, ls prove • 
This lece •• ary Beina is called God. And this God must be intl. 
ni te in aU respeots, tor otherwise He is not a Beinl that 1. 
Necessary with respect to existenoe itselt" OtherwiJe, He would 
take on, in this or that lrespect, the nature ot .. cont1ngent be-
ing. 
Although we,oannot .gre. with Protessor Brightman'. 
pOSition, we can and do admire the sincerity and earnestness ot 
h1s quest tor God and tor truth. Undoubtedly, he puts God in th 
toremo.t place ot importance in his philosophy) atter reading hi 
wO:l'k., "e can reasOna bi, suppo.e that he hal done the same in 
his own personal lite. He has undertaken his study and invest!. 
lationa to protect the honor ot God and the cause ot religion. 
His conclusion to lh! '1Dd~1 ~ ~ expr ••• es a thought to whie 
'W. can all &11' •• , one which .. e can all hope to tollcnn 
Yet there is one thing that all may know. it God eXist, at 
f ' ,all., there 1s _ore to learn about his nature and his pu.r-
~ 'po... than stand. ni tten in any book or has been thoU,lht 
by any human mind. Kay I~ never close our minds against 
this prospect ot growth. 
• 
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